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Securing the Legitimacy of Individual Sanctions in 





Abstract – Traditional deterrence theory relies on a combination of probability and 
severity of punishment to impose a perception of sufficiently high costs to deter 
wrongdoing. Yet when a very high severity of punishment counters a low probability, 
disproportionate outcomes give rise to societal concerns about procedural fairness and 
justice, such that the law loses legitimacy. Any loss of legitimacy undermines would-be 
offenders’ normative commitment to, and voluntary compliance with, the law. The UK 
has encountered significant obstacles in efforts to enhance the deterrence of competition 
law. The Enterprise Act 2002 and the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 
introduced individual sanctions, consisting of a criminal cartel offence and director 
disqualification orders, to deter anti-competitive behaviour. This article argues that poor 
drafting and prosecutorial failure are responsible for the failure to earn and secure the 
legitimacy of the cartel offence. Yet the greatest regulatory failure is not making fuller 
use of the disqualification powers, which have greater legitimacy. By following the 
approach suggested in this article the deterrent value and legitimacy of UK competition 
law would increase, and we would be closer to achieving the goals of the individual 




The principal objective of individual sanctions in UK competition law is to alter the 
calculation undertaken by the agents who act on behalf of and bind firms,1 thereby using 
deterrence theory to decrease the likelihood of the proscribed conduct being carried out in 
future. Traditional deterrence theory relies on a combination of probability of detection 
and severity of punishment to impose a perception of sufficiently high costs to deter 
wrongdoing.2 Yet when the result is a very high penalty to counter a low probability of 
detection and conviction, the risk of disproportionate outcomes to the conduct can give 
rise to societal concerns about procedural fairness and justice, such that the regulatory 
enforcement activity and the specific sanctions lose legitimacy. Any loss of legitimacy 
                                                 
* Senior lecturer in Law, Newcastle University. Email: jonathan.galloway@newcastle.ac.uk. I would like to  
thank Caron Beaton-Wells, Alison Dunn, Ole Pedersen, Michael O’Kane, and particularly the anonymous 
referee for useful and thoughtful comments that have improved the finished article, although all errors and 
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1 See A Riley and DD Sokol, ‘Rethinking Compliance’ (2015) 3(1) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 31, 
43. 
2 See e.g. J Bentham, ‘Principles of Penal Law’, in John Bowring (ed.), The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 
Volume I (Russell & Russell Inc. 1962) and RA Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (3rd edn, Little, Brown 
& Co 1986), 205-212. 
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has the potential to undermine would-be offenders’ normative commitment to the law, 
such that they are less likely to engage in voluntarily compliance. Legitimacy concerns 
can also give rise to increased levels of political and judicial scrutiny of the exercise of 
enforcement discretion, and could easily encounter more sceptical juries who are 
responsive to legitimacy concerns held by the wider public. Thus, efforts to increase the 
effectiveness of sanctions, as a means of preventing proscribed conduct, can be self-
defeating by undermining the law’s legitimacy as a result. The legitimacy of sanctions 
can be nurtured, and societal concerns ameliorated, by patient and prudent exercise of 
enforcement discretion, especially in terms of case selection. Such an approach as part of 
a broader enforcement strategy, which embraces a policy mix and use of diverse tools, 
would build support for the sanctions, and could also engender greater voluntary 
compliance with the law. Importantly, well-judged exercise of enforcement discretion can 
earn legitimacy for the regime, even in the presence of pre-existing legislative defects.   
The UK has pursued a path of trial and error, quite literally, in its efforts to 
enhance the general deterrent effect of UK competition law since 2002. The Enterprise 
Act 2002 and the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 contained provisions that 
sought to establish effective individual sanctions in UK competition law so as to deter, 
and thus prevent anti-competitive behaviour as part of a broader policy objective to boost 
the competitiveness of UK markets, and generally help spur economic growth.3 The 
individual sanctions consist of the recently amended criminal cartel offence under s 188, 
which can result in imprisonment of up to five years,4 and the power to apply for a 
competition disqualification order under s 2045 of the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA02). The 
individual sanctions complement the enforcement tools of the Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA), formerly the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), which normally consists of 
the power to impose fines against firms, and thereby prevent sanctions from being treated 
strictly as a cost of doing business.6  
This article argues that the legislative reforms enacted by the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA13) have eroded the already questionable legitimacy 
of the cartel offence, and suggests how enforcement discretion should now be exercised 
in order to rebuild the legitimacy of individual sanctions in UK competition law. It does 
this by briefly introducing the concept of legitimacy as derived from the regulatory 
enforcement literature in order to identify key principles for regulatory enforcement with 
community confidence. This article also identifies the legitimacy concerns that arise from 
a strategy focused on deterrence theory alone. The discussion alludes to shortcomings 
that would arise whenever any regulatory enforcement strategy is overly dependent on 
                                                 
3 In relation to the Enterprise Act 2002 see e.g. the Department of Trade and Industry, A World Class 
Competition Regime (CM 5233, July 2001) particularly chapters 1 and 7, available at < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/265534/5233.pdf> accessed 
18 November 2016. In relation to the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 see the Department for 
Business, Innovation, and Skills, Growth, Competition and the Competition Regime, Government 
Response to Consultation (BIS/12/512, March 2012), at 3.2 and 7.10 in particular , available at: < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/growth-competition-and-the-competition-regime-
government-response-to-consultation> accessed 18 November 2016. 
4 S. 190(1) EA02. 
5 S 204 EA02 inserted s 9A into the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
6 For discussion of the difficulties in devising effective sanctions against corporations, see B Fisse and J 
Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability (CUP 1993), 41-44. 
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operationalising deterrence theory. Yet, this article is focused on identifying and 
addressing legitimacy defects inherent within the specified individual sanctions, and 
given the regular public pronouncements from Government and the UK competition 
authority, past and present, that the aim of sanctions is to deter anti-competitive 
behaviour,7 this article to an extent thus assumes the existence of a prevailing 
enforcement strategy set upon deterrence. As such, a detailed analysis of the over-arching 
enforcement strategy in UK competition law, and proposals to catch up with other 
regulatory regimes that embrace policy and sanction mixes, informed by behavioural 
insights, are less relevant to the operation of the individual sanctions, and their 
legitimacy, and are mostly outside the scope of this article and left to other work in the 
field.8  
Moving from the abstract to a positive analysis of UK competition law, this article 
proceeds to first analyse the legitimacy issues inherent within the legislative drafting of 
the individual sanctions, and secondly the exercise of enforcement discretion by the OFT, 
and now the CMA. While criminal sanctions can provide an important enforcement tool 
in competition law’s sanction mix, such powers would ideally derive legitimacy from 
public support for their introduction. It is argued that enforcement of the cartel offence 
had no such support and prior to the ERRA13 it was already suffering from a significant 
lack of legitimacy through a mixture of poor legislative drafting and failure by the OFT. 
This was in spite the opportunity to earn legitimacy through astute case selection and 
advocacy. It will be argued that the OFT’s, and now also the CMA’s, greatest failure 
arises from the inability to use enforcement discretion to earn legitimacy for the defective 
cartel offence. This article will also argue that the legitimacy defects of the criminal 
cartel offence have been amplified as a result of the Government’s ERRA13 reforms, and 
that the CMA should thus begin to make significant use of its powers to apply for director 
disqualification orders, while patiently employing a prudent case selection approach for 
future cartel offence prosecutions. The OFT and the CMA have failed to apply for any 
competition disqualification orders (CDOs) under s 9A of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA86) since it entered into force on 20 June 2003. The 
lack of CDO applications is perplexing given the periods of significant uncertainty 
surrounding the cartel offence, when CDO applications would have demonstrated 
enforcement activity and provided a deterrent value (consistent with the enforcement 
strategy) while awaiting a suitable case to prosecute under s 188 EA02. The recent first 
use of disqualification undertaking powers by the CMA under s 9B of the CDDA86 is a 
late but welcome first step in routinely using these powers. This article ultimately argues 
that the recent reforms to the cartel offence, with resulting uncertainty (and the lesson 
hopefully learnt to wait for the ‘right’ test case) provides a propitious set of 
circumstances to bring the first CDO application and make greater use of competition 
disqualification powers. Establishing the meaningful threat of a CDO against individuals 
will start to build a higher probability of individual sanction in UK competition law 
                                                 
7 See e.g. UK Government consultations (n 3) and M Grenfell, CMA Executive Director for Enforcement, 
‘UK competition enforcement – progress and prospects’ Speech to the IFLR Competition Law Forum, 9 
November 2016, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/michael-grenfell-on-the-cmas-
progress-in-enforcing-competition-law> accessed 18 November 2016.  
8 See e.g. discussion in J Galloway, ‘Competition law and regulatory compliance: reconceptualising 
deterrence to shape behaviour’ in J Galloway (ed.), Intersections of Antitrust: Policy and Regulation (OUP 
forthcoming). 
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without giving rise to the same level of legitimacy concerns that bedevil the cartel 
offence. Routine use of the specific CDO powers would enhance the UK competition 




1. Legitimacy and Enforcement Strategy 
 
Hawkins argues that ‘[l]egitimacy is an imperative for public organizations, hence 
regulatory agencies’ practices help to secure them their place in the moral order’.9 Yet it 
also logically follows that the agencies’ practices can serve to undermine, as opposed to 
secure, their regulatory place and standing in society if the practices are perceived as 
lacking legitimacy. It thus becomes necessary to articulate a concept of legitimacy which 
will serve to guide and set the boundaries of regulatory activity. Hawkins points to 
Gusfield’s view that prosecution ‘when viewed as right, proper, and appropriate, is 
legitimate’ and when viewed in this way it would thus have moral legitimacy and the 
ability to adopt an instrumental approach for action in the public interest.10 In this sense 
exercise of enforcement discretion with legitimacy has the potential to provide ex post 
facto legitimacy to a defective legislative design. Hodges goes further and adopts a 
broader sense of legitimacy, albeit he also considers the acquisition and retention of it no 
less important:  
 ‘[b]y the legitimacy of the system, we mean the processes by which the rules are 
 made, applied, observed, enforced and sanctioned. Every aspect should be 
 perceived to be fair. This requires there to be fairness in fact (compliance with the 
 individuals’ personal ethics…) and for the practices to be perceived as fair, which 
 requires transparency in the procedures.’11 
Perceptions of what is fair, right, proper, and appropriate can thus be argued to be 
principles that act as constraints upon regulatory action. Furthermore, regulators’ 
accountability to the wider public for policy choices and the exercise of enforcement 
discretion is necessary to provide for legitimacy while carrying out activity in furtherance 
of their mandate.12 Determining the regulatory approach to fulfil a mandate, i.e. deciding 
upon the enforcement strategy, becomes crucial in order to ensure that enforcement 
activity is effective, efficient, and maintains legitimacy by having community 
confidence.13   
 
                                                 
9 K Hawkins, Law as Last Resort: Prosecution Decision-Making in a Regulatory Agency (OUP 2002), 209. 
10 Ibid., 417, referring to JR Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance 
Movement (University of Illinois Press 1963). 
11 C Hodges, Law and Corporate Behaviour: Integrating Theories of Regulation, Enforcement, Compliance 
and Ethics (Hart Publishing 2015), 27. 
12 WE Kovacic and M Winerman, ‘The Federal Trade Commission as an Independent Agency: Autonomy, 
Legitimacy, and Effectiveness’ (2015) 100 Iowa Law Review 2085, 2090 and 2095. Also see I Simonsson, 
Legitimacy in EU Cartel Control (OUP 2010), 271. 
13 See N Gunningham, ‘Compliance, Deterrence and Beyond’ (2015) RegNet Research Paper N.87, 
Regulatory Institutions Network. 
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The regulatory literature has historically focused upon the weight that should be afforded 
to variants and mixes of deterrence theory and retributivism in determining enforcement 
strategy. The former theory assumes that decision-makers are rational actors, capable of 
being influenced by increasing the perceived cost of infringements. The latter theory is 
premised upon the moral legitimacy of wrongdoers receiving their just deserts in a 
proportional way, which seeks to encourage compliance by building on established 
normative values.14 Both theories have well chronicled deficiencies and thus regulatory 
enforcement strategy, notably in the environmental law domain, has long since rejected 
the dichotomy as a false one and drawn on both theories, and innovative methods, in 
order to attain effective, efficient, and legitimate enforcement.15 As will be shown 
however, the enforcement strategy underpinning UK competition law is very heavily 
focused upon traditional deterrence theory, with the result that enforcement in practice 
has tended to resort to use of the wrong enforcement tools at the wrong time. The 
legitimacy concerns resulting from the singular enforcement strategy16 have served to 
undermine the effectiveness of s 188 EA02 in UK competition law.   
Individual sanctions are part of a competition authority’s enforcement toolkit and 
are intended to both prevent infringements of competition law, i.e. prevent anti-
competitive behaviour, and to address the infringements that have nonetheless taken 
place.17 Given that sanctions under the predominantly public enforcement systems in the 
EU and UK will rarely have a direct role in providing a means of corrective justice,18 the 
main task of sanctions can only be to prevent infringements by deterring future 
wrongdoing, and in so doing also ensure offenders get their ‘just deserts’ as a 
consequence of their conduct. That said, historically the OFT, and now the CMA also, 
                                                 
14 For a useful account of both theories of criminal justice see RL Christopher, ‘Deterring Retributivism: 
the Injustice of “Just” Punishment’ (2002) 96(3) Northwestern University Law Review 843. 
15 See e.g. N Gunningham (n 13) as well as I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (OUP 1992), 
21, which rejects the artificial ‘crude polarisation’ between deterrence and compliance models of 
regulation. 
16 The heavy reliance upon deterrence theory in competition law enforcement strategy is discussed in detail 
in C Hodges (n 11), ch 4, particularly 89-91 and 131-133.  
17 See the typology identified in WPJ Wils, ‘Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice’ (2006) 29(2) 
World Competition 183 which also includes ‘clarifying the content of the prohibitions’ as a further task of 
competition law enforcement. 
18 Two related exceptions come to mind. The first of which is the recently established, and potentially 
significant, power of the CMA to approve voluntary redress schemes at the time of, or following, the 
adoption of an infringement decision. Where the CMA approves a voluntary redress scheme it may reduce 
a penalty that would otherwise be imposed in a relevant infringement decision by up to 20%. This new 
power was part of a series of reforms designed to incentivise increased levels of private enforcement of 
competition law in the UK, and is found in ss 49C-49E Competition Act 1998 (as inserted by s 81 and 
Schedule 8, paragraphs 10 – 12 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015). Also see the CMA Guidance on the 
approval of voluntary redress schemes for infringements of competition law (14 August 2015, CMA40): < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/approval-of-redress-schemes-for-competition-law-
infringements> accessed 18 November 2016. The other exception is the explicit allowance in EU law that 
compensation paid as a result of a consensual settlement could be a mitigating factor when determining the 
level of fine to impose, see Article 18(3) of Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union [2014] 
OJ L349/1 (‘the Damages Directive’). 
 6 
have focused upon general deterrence19 to such a great extent20 that enforcement can (and 
this article argues it does) lose the perception of proportionality with the result that the 
corollary task of providing ‘just desert’ is somewhat forgotten.  
In order to achieve compliance through effective deterrence, sanctions must be 
tailored to impact upon the factors present when firms, or agents acting on their behalf, 
decide whether or not to participate in a cartel. Tyler argues that policy makers tend to 
adopt an instrumental perspective on how to achieve compliance by seeking to deter 
proscribed behaviour through impacting upon the perceived gains and losses that are 
expected from engaging in the conduct.21 Such an instrumental perspective closely 
follows Becker’s model, arguing that would-be-offenders determine their conduct 
according to a rational cost-benefit analysis, which implies that sanctions should thus be 
designed to outweigh any rewards that are to be had by acting illegally.22 It is this 
approach that underpins traditional deterrence theory and provides a justification for 
punishment.23 In order to effect change in the cost-benefit analysis undertaken by would-
be-offenders, Posner highlights the necessity to choose a combination of probability and 
severity of punishment, which will impose sufficient cost to outweigh the anticipated 
benefits.24 Given that the probability of punishment (i.e. likelihood of detection and 
punishment) tends to be low due to enforcement variables, it must therefore be offset by a 
high level of severity in order to deter.25  
The shortfalls of traditional deterrence theory are widely acknowledged and its 
ability to provide a complete model to achieve legal compliance by deterring would-be-
offenders is questionable on a number of fronts. There are social psychological studies 
suggesting that, for some crimes at least, an increase in sanction severity does not act as a 
deterrent but an increase in the probability of sanction does.26 This view has considerable 
support,27 including specifically in the competition law field28 where it has been 
                                                 
19 Thus the sanction is fixed at a level that ‘might be expected to deter others from committing a similar 
offence’, to be contrasted with specific deterrence aimed at preventing recidivism, see A Ashworth, 
‘Sentencing’ in M Maguire, R Morgan & R Reiner (eds), Oxford Handbook of Criminology (OUP 2007), 
993. 
20 See e.g. M Grenfell (n 7) and discussion below. 
21 TR Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Yale University Press 1990), 3 and 21. 
22 GS Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ (1968) 76 Journal of Political Economy 
169. 
23 See also J Bentham (n 2) and RA Posner (n 2). 
24 RA Posner (n 2) at 207. 
25 See T Calvani and TH Calvani, ‘Custodial sanctions for cartel offences: An appropriate sanction in 
Australia?’ (2009) 17 Competition & Consumer Law Journal 119, 128-129. Indeed Posner outlines an 
efficiency argument ‘for combining heavy prison terms for convicted criminals with low probabilities of 
apprehension and conviction’, see Posner (n 2) 212. 
26 See E Aronson, TD Wilson & RM Akert, Social Psychology (4th edn, Prentice Hall 2002) 584-587, WN 
Evans, D Neville & JD Graham, ‘General deterrence of drunk driving: Evaluation of American Politics’ 
(1991) 11 Risk Analysis 279, and RB Voas, HD Holder & PJ Gruenewald, ‘The effect of drinking and 
driving interventions on alcohol-related traffic crashes within a comprehensive community trial’ (1999) 92 
Addiction S221. 
27 See e.g. Tyler (n 21) 21, and C Parker, ‘Criminal Cartel Sanctions and Compliance: The Gap between 
Rhetoric and Reality’ in C Beaton-Wells & A Ezrachi (eds), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an 
International Regulatory Movement (Hart Publishing 2011), 250. 
28 For the view of a former leading antitrust official see e.g. DI Baker, ‘Punishment for Cartel Participants 
in the US: A Special Model?’ in C Beaton-Wells & A Ezrachi (eds), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies 
of an International Regulatory Movement (Hart Publishing 2011), 31. 
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suggested that ‘empirical deterrence research persistently finds that the factors that make 
the most difference to compliance behaviour are the perceived likelihood of detection and 
enforcement, more than the objective severity and subjective fearsomeness of the 
sanctions imposed’.29 This is not to suggest that a frequently levied small financial fine 
achieves a greater deterrent value than a rarely used sanction of imprisonment of course. 
Yet a criminal offence that is perceived as so fundamentally flawed as to be unable to be 
successfully prosecuted at trial may carry such a low deterrent value that alternative 
enforcement tools are required in order to sustain a requisite minimum level of 
deterrence. Some proponents of traditional deterrence theory recognise the difficulties 
arising from combining very low-level enforcement (a small probability of sanction) with 
extremely high sanctions, finding the extremely high sanction to be a sub-optimal use of 
resources,30 but those proponents nonetheless continue to adhere to the basic matrix of 
low probability and high severity of punishment.31 Traditional deterrence theory thus 
rests on the questionable assumption that high sanctions will alter conduct and deter 
would-be-offenders, and where this is not achieved it is usually because the sanctions are 
not high enough. This article argues that the same basic assumption exists in relation to 
individual sanctions in UK competition law, and this creates legitimacy issues that are 
highlighted in detail below. 
Perhaps the principal legitimacy issue with traditional deterrence theory is that it 
becomes overly concerned with general deterrence32 such that a gap opens up between 
the sanction imposed and the offending conduct in individual cases. That gap creates 
disproportionate outcomes that give rise to societal concerns about procedural fairness 
and justice. Yeung comments that  deterrence-based accounts of punishment are ‘prone to 
generating counter-intuitive outcomes which may appear at odds with the community’s 
perception of fairness and morality’,33 and we know that perceptions of fairness are key 
to underpinning legitimacy. Traditional deterrence theory may be thought to set aside 
concerns about the severity of sanction by arguing that the benefit to society from lower 
crime justifies any seemingly disproportionate or unfair sanction imposed on the 
individual offender,34 although it is far from clear that a jury, or the judiciary for that 
matter, would willingly impose a sanction perceived to be disproportionate so as to 
further a broader goal of general deterrence. Yet this response undermines what may be 
an even more important means of preventing cartel activity and achieving compliance: 
encouraging a societal view of cartel behaviour as inherently wrong and the law 
proscribing that conduct as fair, right, proper, and appropriate. Such a societal view 
                                                 
29 C Beaton-Wells and C Parker, ‘Justifying criminal sanctions for cartel conduct: a hard case’ (2013) 1(1) 
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 198, 205-206. 
30 The Posnerian approach might thus be described as advocating for ‘absolute deterrence’ whereas the 
other (arguably more pragmatic) approach is akin to an ‘injury to others’ strain of traditional deterrence 
theory. See discussion in K Yeung, Securing Compliance: A Principled Approach (Hart Publishing 2004), 
63-72. 
31 MK Block & JG Sidak, ‘The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and Then’ 
(1979-1980) 68 Geo LJ 1131. 
32 See A Ashworth (n 19). 
33 Yeung (n 30) 70. 
34 Bentham acknowledges this by commenting that ‘punishment which, considered in itself, appeared base 
and repugnant to all generous sentiments, is elevated to the first rank of benefits, which it is regarded not as 
an act of wrath or of vengeance against a guilty or unfortunate individual who have given way to 
mischievous inclinations, but as an indispensable sacrifice to the common safety.’ Bentham (n 16) 396. 
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would help provide for a strong normative commitment to the law.35 Recent empirical 
research in this field has found that the strongest predictor of awareness of the law and a 
perceived probability of sanction, both key for achieving compliance, was agreement 
with the law itself.36 Furthermore, a perception of fair and neutral law enforcement and 
decision-making demonstrates the State’s, and thus the regulator’s, legitimacy to those 
subject to regulation, and individuals are known to feel a greater duty to obey, and 
willingness to comply with laws and regulators that are perceived as legitimate.37 The 
converse is that laws and sanctions that are considered unfair by society have diminished 
legitimacy, which can have a negative impact on legal compliance.38 One of the views of 
legitimacy put forward by Tyler, Fagan, and Geller, suggests that ‘legitimacy of legal 
authorities is earned, if not negotiated, through actions that demonstrate its moral 
grounding.’39 This is an important contribution. The implication is therefore that actions 
(and laws) that are perceived as unfair can deprive a regulator of their cloak of legitimacy 
in the eyes of the regulated, thereby negatively impacting on voluntary compliance with 
the law. 
Given the deficiencies in the classic deterrence model, one could turn to 
retributivism as a tool to try to prevent anti-competitive behaviour.40 Interestingly, 
Simester and von Hirsch argue that when using the criminal law to deter, the act of 
criminalisation is ex ante rational coercion, and this can only be legitimate where the 
threat involves a punishment that would be deserved.41 Perceived in this way, rational 
coercion, or traditional deterrence theory, can only be justified where there is also 
justification on retributive grounds for the threatened punishment. Retributivism may 
thus act as a considerable constraint upon sanctions, even where a deterrence led strategy 
is employed.42 It would also be advisable to learn from other fields, including 
environmental regulation, where policy mixes and flexible enforcement tools have been 
                                                 
35 See Aronson, Wilson & Akert (n 26) 587-588 and Parker (n 27) 257-258. 
36 Beaton-Wells and Parker (n 29) 209-210, specifically dealing with the context of a criminal cartel 
offence. The same empirical research found that individuals who believed price-fixing should not be 
against the law were an astonishing seven times more likely to believe that it was in fact not against the 
law. 
37 See e.g. J Jackson, ‘On the Dual Motivational Force of Legitimate Authority’ LSE Law, Society and 
Economy Working Papers 4/2015, d4. Available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2564592> accessed 18 November 2016.  
38 See Tyler (n 21), 26, 178, K Murphy, ‘Regulating More Effectively: The Relationship between 
Procedural Justice, Legitimacy and Tax Non-Compliance’ (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society 562, and 
E Fehr and B Rockenbach, ‘Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism’ (2003) 422 Nature 137. 
For a discussion of these issues in the competition law context see L Guttuso, ‘Leniency and the Two Faces 
of Janus: Where Public and Private Enforcement Merge and Converge’ in C Beaton-Wells and C Tran 
(eds), Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary Age: The Leniency Religion, (Hart Publishing 2015), 
295 – 296. 
39 TR Tyler, J Fagan, and A Geller, ‘Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young 
Urban Men’s Legal Socialization’ (2014) 11(4) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 751, 754. 
40 See PH Robinson and JM Darley, ‘The Utility of Desert’ (1997) 91(2) Northwestern University Law 
Review 453, and KM Carlsmith, JM Darley, & PH Robinson, ‘Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just 
Deserts as Motives for Punishment’ (2002) 83(2) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 284. 
41 AP Simester and A von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalisation (Hart 
2011), 8. 
42 This also has implications for the exercise of enforcement discretion by the regulator, as punishment 
needs to be is perceived as deserved in order to maintain legitimacy. See discussion further below. 
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debated and deployed for many years.43 Yet there is little evidence to suggest that the 
enforcement strategy in relation to the individual sanctions in UK competition law has 
embraced such an approach, and the objective of this article is to argue how best to 
secure legitimacy within the existing deterrence led enforcement strategy, rather than to 
remould that strategy in this work.44 The next section argues that s 188 EA02 was ‘pre-
programmed to become a regulatory failure’45 as a result of poor legislative drafting. Yet 
there was potential for redemption if the early enforcement activity was crafted around a 
strategy to earn normative commitment to the law, and thereby enhance its legitimacy. 
 
2. Legislative Drafting 
The rationale for introducing s 188 EA02, as well as s 9A CDDA1986, was strongly 
motivated by the perceived inability of fines against firms to serve as a meaningful 
deterrent against anti-competitive conduct.46 This confirms that the enforcement strategy 
underpinning individual sanctions was hardwired to traditional deterrence theory and 
eschews decades of regulatory theory advances that promote policy mixes, as opposed to 
reliance on a singular approach. There was also a failure to consider the merits of more 
flexible approaches advocated by influential theories such as ‘responsive regulation’, 
which allows for an incremental escalation of regulatory response depending upon the 
firm’s response of future compliance.47 Another flexible approach is ‘smart regulation’, 
partially a response to perceived shortcomings in the responsive regulation model, and as 
such it broadens the regulatory context to include a range of instruments, institutions, and 
encompasses other influences upon firm behaviour and compliance.48 Smart regulation 
continues to rely upon a means of incremental escalation of response but seeks to ensure 
that the response is a holistic one taking account of the range of means of influencing 
compliance behaviour. While these approaches may not be well suited to unadulterated 
transplantation into the competition ‘regulatory’ context, they ought to be studied to 
avoid the known failings of a singular policy approach. Fines for anti-competitive 
behaviour are themselves strongly motivated by the desire to secure deterrence by 
following a Beckerian approach49 at an EU50 as well as UK level.51 Nonetheless, the 
                                                 
43 See e.g. I Ayres and J Braithwaite (n 15), MK Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft: Controlling Risks, Solving 
Problems, and Managing Compliance (Brookings Institution 2000), and N Gunningham and P Grabosky, 
Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (OUP 2008).  
44 For this see e.g. discussion in J Galloway (n 8). 
45 S Wilks, ‘Cartel Criminalisation as Juridification: Political and Regulatory Dangers’ in C Beaton-Wells 
& A Ezrachi (eds), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory Movement (Hart 
Publishing 2011), 355. Kadish could be said to have implied a similar outcome when criminal sanctions are 
used to enforce economic offences that lack public opprobrium, SH Kadish, ‘Some observations on the use 
of criminal sanctions in enforcing economic regulations’ (1963) 30(3) U Chi L Rev 423. 
46 See Department of Trade and Industry White Paper, A World Class Competition Regime, 2001 (Cm 
5233), 7.13-7.15 and box 7.3. 
47 See e.g. I Ayres and J Braithwaite (n 15), and J Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive 
Regulation (OUP 2002). 
48 See e.g. N Gunningham (n 13), and N Gunningham, ‘Regulation: from traditional to cooperative’ (2015) 
RegNet Research Paper No.91, Regulatory Institutions Network. 
49 Becker (n 22). Becker’s deterrence model was first applied to antitrust by WM Landes in ‘Optimal 
Sanctions for Antitrust Violations’ (1983) 50 U Chi L Rev 652. 
50 The Court of Justice of the EU has recognized the need to ensure the ‘necessary deterrent effect’ of fines, 
see e.g. Cases 100-103/80 Musique Diffusion française and others v Commission [1983] ECR 1825, [106]. 
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limits imposed on fines so as to avoid undesirable outcomes from regulatory intervention, 
including bankruptcy,52 prevent fines from reaching an optimal level of deterrence.53 It is 
arguable that the advent of leniency programmes, first instituted by the US in 1978 but 
regarded as fairly ineffective until significant revisions in 1993,54 has boosted deterrence 
through increasing the probability of sanction, yet it is not clear that fines can overcome 
the agency problem55 and thus may always produce a sub-optimal level of deterrence, 
Additionally, recent empirical research and subsequent analysis is starting to question the 
assumption that leniency programmes and increasing leniency applications signify an 
increase in the probability of detection and sanction, instead suggesting that evidence of 
their impact on deterrence is rather weak, and that they can be vulnerable to being 
‘gamed’ by firms.56  
                                                                                                                                                 
The objective to achieve general, as well as specific, deterrence is also clearly recognised in the European 
Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation 
No 1/2003, [2006] OJ C201/02, 4, 30-31, 37. See J Faull and A Nikpay (eds), The EU Law of Competition 
(3rd edn, OUP 2014), 8.661 – 8.673. The goal of deterrence is also regularly cited in press statements 
regarding case decisions, e.g. J Almunia, Speech to the European Parliament ECON Committee, State of 
Play and Priorities, 30 November 2010, Brussels (SPEECH/10/703), where Commissioner Almunia stated 
‘The large fines of our last decision [Air Cargo cartel] rekindled the debate on our [cartel] policy, so let me 
restate one of its principles: our fines must be high enough to deter anti-competitive behaviour, but not so 
high as to put firms out of business.’ 
51 The applicable fining guidelines for infringement decisions by the CMA under the Competition Act 1998 
explicitly highlights the twin objectives of fines to: i) reflect the seriousness of the infringement; and ii) 
‘ensure that the threat of penalties will deter both the infringing undertakings and other undertakings that 
may be considering anti-competitive activities from engaging in them.’ See the OFT’s Guidance as to the 
appropriate amount of a penalty (OFT423, September 2012), 1.4, which has been adopted by the CMA 
Board, see Guidance on the CMA’s investigation procedures in Competition Act 1998 cases (CMA8), 95. 
52 Which would increase the level of concentration in the market and sit at odds with the normal aims of 
competition authority intervention, see e.g. C Craycraft, JL Craycraft, & JC Gallo, ‘Antitrust Sanctions and 
a Firm’s Ability to Pay’ (1997) 12 Review of Industrial Organisation 171. 
53 There is a wealth of literature pointing to the inability of fines to provide an optimal level of deterrence, 
see e.g. discussion of the ‘deterrence trap’ in JC Coffee, Jr, ‘“No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment’ (1980-1981) 79 Mich L Rev 386. More 
recent literature includes Wils (n 5), JM Connor, AA Foer, and S Udwin, ‘Criminalizing Cartels: An 
American Perspective’ (2010) 1(2) New Journal of European Criminal Law 199, B Wardhaugh, ‘Closing 
the Deterrence Gap: Individual Liability, the Cartel Offence and the BIS Consultation’ (2011) 10(3) 
Competition Law Journal 175, JM Connor and RH Lande, ‘Cartel as Rational Business Strategy: Crime 
Pays’ (2012) 34 Cardozo Law Review 427, F Smuda, “Cartel Overcharges and the Deterrent Effect of EU 
Competition Law (2014) 10(1) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 63, and GJ Werden & MJ 
Simon, ‘Why Price Fixers Should Go to Prison’ (1987) 32 Antitrust Bulletin 917. 
54 C Beaton-Wells, ‘Leniency Policies: Revolution or Religion?’ in C Beaton-Wells and C Tran (eds), Anti-
Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary Age: The Leniency Religion, (Hart Publishing 2015), 18 – 19. 
55 See e.g. F Thépot, ‘Leniency and Individual Liability: Opening the Black Box of the Cartel’ (2011) 7(2) 
Competition Law Review 221. 
56 C Marvão and G Spagnolo, ‘What do we know about the Effectiveness of Leniency Policies? A Survey 
of the Empirical and Experimental Evidence’and A Stephan and A Nikpay, ‘Leniency Decision-Making 
from a Corporate Perspective: Complex Realities’, both in C Beaton-Wells and C Tran (eds), Anti-Cartel 
Enforcement in a Contemporary Age: The Leniency Religion, (Hart Publishing 2015). Also see JE 
Harrington Jr and MH Chang, ‘When Can We Expect a Corporate Leniency Program to Result in Fewer 
Cartels?’, 11 August 2014, available on SSRN at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2530545>  accessed 18 November 2016, and NH 
Miller, ‘Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement’ (2009) 99 American Economic Review 750. 
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In opting to introduce individual sanctions as a complementary, not alternative, 
enforcement tool to sit alongside fines, Parliament was thereby acting to increase the 
severity of the sanction attached to anti-competitive behaviour. That one of the individual 
sanctions recruited the criminal law, with the potential for imprisonment for up to 5 
years, in an instrumental fashion to achieve deterrence with only 11% of the public 
supporting such a sanction,57 only served to dramatically increase the enforcement 
obstacles to addressing anti-competitive behaviour. The very low level public support for 
imprisonment at the time of introducing the cartel offence suggests that the wider pubic 
would not regard the sanction as fair, right, proper, and appropriate, thus immediately 
creating a legitimacy concern.58 Enforcement activity would have to address this concern 
in order to overcome the legitimacy defect and attain community confidence. 
Furthermore, instrumentalism, even when the sanctions are well targeted, is known to 
encounter problems due to an overly narrow focus on problem-solving, and a lack of 
foresight to address the resulting broader challenges.59 It has been the subsequent efforts 
to ensure the effectiveness of the criminal cartel offence (s 188 EA02), measured in a 
narrow sense, which have ironically further eroded its legitimacy. 
The legitimacy of the criminal cartel offence has been questioned since s 188 
EA02 first entered into force. Any normative justification for criminalising cartels is 
based upon their perceived harmful economic effects, and is thus premised upon a policy 
choice in favour of free markets and a high value being placed upon benefits stemming 
from competitive markets.60 Yet as Harding, Beaton-Wells and Edwards explain, harmful 
outcomes and competition law intervention are far more ‘contingent and ambiguous’ in 
the case of cartels than in many other spheres in which the criminal law is employed and 
the harm is more self-evident.61 As the normative justification for cartel criminalisation is 
less intuitive than for many other crimes, such as for harms against the person or 
property, it thus requires persuasion and a strong narrative of harm that withstands 
scrutiny in each case. The more complex justification for criminalisation thus creates 
legitimacy and credibility challenges that must be addressed by competition law 
enforcement. If competition law enforcers fail to convincingly depict defendants as 
morally blameworthy and their prosecution as just, then prosecution, which Hawkins has 
described as the ‘need to dramatize a measure…of activity’ in order to build support for 
the enforcer’s mandate,62 will further erode the enforcer’s legitimacy instead of 
strengthening it. Kovacic is more specific and highlights the necessity for a competition 
authority to build acceptance for new criminal sanctions and establish their legitimacy.63 
                                                 
57 A Stephan, ‘Survey of Public Attitudes to Price-Fixing and Cartel Enforcement in Britain’ (2008) 5 
Competition Law Review 123. 
58 See K Hawkins (n 9), 417, referring to JR Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American 
Temperance Movement (University of Illinois Press 1963). 
59 See e.g. F Haines, The Paradox of Regulation: What Regulation Can Achieve and What it Cannot 
(Edward Elgar 2011), 24.  
60 C Harding, C Beaton-Wells and J Edwards, ‘Leniency and Criminal Sanctions in Anti-Cartel 
Enforcement: Happily Married or Uneasy Bedfellows?’ in C Beaton-Wells and C Tran (eds), Anti-Cartel 
Enforcement in a Contemporary Age: The Leniency Religion, (Hart Publishing 2015), 240 
61 Ibid, and 244. 
62 K Hawkins (n 9), 244. 
63 WE Kovacic, ‘Criminal Enforcement Norms in Competition Policy: Insights from US Experience’ in C 
Beaton-Wells & A Ezrachi (eds), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory 
Movement (Hart Publishing 2011), 70. 
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The need to build legitimacy for s 188 EA02 was acute given the aforementioned lack of 
public support for criminalisation64 and what can surely now be described as erroneous 
drafting of the original offence to outlaw agreements made or implemented ‘dishonestly’. 
Persuasive critiques have pointed to a number of problems of using the dishonesty 
standard in this context,65 none more so than by highlighting that the construction and 
context of s 188 EA02 amounts to the law attempting to ‘pull itself up by its own 
bootstraps’.66 Criminalising the cartel offence was ahead of public opinion, and it thus 
sought to establish societal condemnation of cartels by the process of criminalisation 
itself67 (as opposed to reflecting a pre-existing societal consensus). The problem lay, 
however, in that the chosen dishonesty standard was assumed to reflect existing societal 
views and was not designed to help foster a hardening of attitudes.68 Dishonesty requires 
that a jury regard the conduct as dishonest according to the ‘ordinary standards of 
reasonable people’69 in order to secure a conviction. The drafters concocted an illogical 
combination of seeking to use successful prosecutions as a means of remedying the lack 
of public support for criminalisation (i.e. using the criminal law as an educational tool), 
while inserting a substantive test such that the reasonable person would have to agree that 
the conduct was already dishonest in order for a jury to convict.70 The Australian 
Government also considered and ultimately rejected incorporating the dishonesty 
standard into the Australian cartel offence after it had been included in s 188 EA02 in the 
UK.71 Given the plethora of difficulties associated with the adoption of the dishonesty 
test, not to mention the wider damage that is associated with overuse of the criminal 
law,72 it was destined to cause prosecutors considerable difficulty and this was realised in 
                                                 
64 Stephan (n 57). 
65 See e.g. J Joshua and C Harding, ‘Breaking Up the Hard Core: The Prospects for the Proposed Cartel 
Offence’ (2002) Criminal Law Review 933 
66 R Williams, ‘Cartels in the Criminal Law Landscape’ in C Beaton-Wells & A Ezrachi (eds), 
Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory Movement (Hart Publishing 2011), 
289. 
67 This approach has been described as both forward-looking and top-down, see respectively P Whelan, ‘A 
Principled Argument for Personal Criminal Sanctions Punishment under EC Cartel Law’ (2007) 4 
Competition Law Review 7, and C Harding, ‘Business Collusion as a Criminological Phenomenon: 
Exploring the Global Criminalisation of Business Cartels’ (2006) 14 Critical Criminology 181, 200. 
68 See J Joshua, ‘DOA: Can the UK Cartel Offence be Resuscitated?’ in C Beaton-Wells & A Ezrachi 
(eds.), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory Movement (Hart Publishing 
2011), 148. 
69 The substantive test for dishonesty was laid down in R v. Ghosh [1982] 2 All ER 689, and also requires 
that the defendant him or herself also realised that their conduct was dishonest by those standards. 
70 Indeed Joshua points to the lack of rigour of analysis in the selection of dishonesty by the drafters, J 
Joshua and C Harding (n 65) particularly II.B. Additionally see A MacCulloch, ‘Honesty, Morality and the 
Cartel Offence’ (2007) 28(6) ECLR 355, 361-362, and D Corker, ‘Opinion: Criminal Cartel Offence 
Revision’ (2014) 13(3) Competition Law Journal 262, 263. 
71 See B Fisse, ‘The Cartel Offence: Dishonesty?’ (2007) 35 Australian Business Law Review 235, Calvani 
and Calvani (n 25) 135-137, F Haines and C Beaton-Wells, ‘Ambiguities in Criminalizing Cartels: A 
Political Economy’ (2012) 52 British Journal of Criminology 953, and A MacCulloch, ‘The Cartel 
Offence: Is Honesty the Best Policy?’ in BJ Rodger (ed) Ten Years of UK Competition Law Reform (DUP 
2010). 
72 See discussion in Williams (n 66) and A Stephan, ‘“The Battle for Hearts and Minds”: The Role of the 
Media in Treating Cartels as Criminal’, in C Beaton-Wells & A Ezrachi (eds), Criminalising Cartels: 
Critical Studies of an International Regulatory Movement (Hart Publishing 2011), 384. More generally also 
see discussion in G Lamond, ‘What is a Crime?’ (2007) 27(4) OJLS 609. 
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the only contested prosecution under the original s 188 EA02.73 Even with its hands on an 
imperfect legislative tool however, the OFT had the opportunity to earn legitimacy74 
through astute exercise of enforcement discretion, particularly in relation to case 
selection, and pro-active advocacy to build support for the offence from vital 
constituents, including the courts (judges and juries), the business community, and the 
wider public.75 The next section addresses the exercise of enforcement discretion by the 
OFT and argues that through a series of missteps and poor judgment, it failed to seize the 
opportunity to earn legitimacy for the cartel offence and establish a normative 
commitment to s 188 EA02. 
 
3. Exercise of Enforcement Discretion 
Justice should be blind yet we all recognise the value of precedent, and so selecting a 
suitable test case to establish precedent is an important symbolic exercise of enforcement 
discretion that rests with the regulator. Hawkins highlights the threat posed by 
ambivalence about right and wrong, such as with a lack of public support for 
criminalising cartels, and he identifies the need for selective symbolic action to maintain 
legitimacy where ‘there is a lack of substantial moral and political consensus about the 
agency’s mandate’.76 In such circumstances, it becomes crucial that the symbolic 
enforcement activity targets conduct that is widely perceived as morally blameworthy,77 
so that a perception of fair, right, proper, and appropriate enforcement is built up. Where 
the symbolic enforcement activity targets conduct that is not easily characterised as 
wrongful according to established norms, it would be unable to command community 
confidence and may further undermine legitimacy, rather than remedying the regime’s 
defects. Indeed Hawkins also suggests that enforcement activity regarded as undeserved 
‘invites condemnation as vindictiveness’ by the public and the firms that are subject to 
regulation.78 Such a scenario hardly fosters community confidence in the regulator, nor 
engenders a compliance culture within the business community. The OFT had a mixed 
record in exercising its judgment to build legitimacy with regards to its civil enforcement 
powers. Early investigations involved well-known consumer goods such as board 
games79 and replica football strips,80 those where the National Health Service, and thus 
the UK taxpayer, was the victim of anti-competitive behaviour,81 and later investigations 
                                                 
73 See the jury verdict of not guilty against Nicholas Stringer and Clive Dean in the criminal cartel 
prosecution involving galvanized steel tanks. Note that a third defendant, Peter Nigel Snee, pleaded guilty 
under s 188 EA02 before the trial commenced. See ‘CMA statement following completion of criminal 
cartel prosecution’ CMA Press Release, 24 June 2015, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-
statement-following-completion-of-criminal-cartel-prosecution> accessed 18 November 2016. Also see L 
Fortado, ‘UK antitrust watchdog loses criminal case’ Financial Times, 24 June 2015. 
74 See discussion above, and particular in reference to Tyler, Fagan, and Geller (n 39), 754. 
75 See Kovacic (n 63) 59-60. 
76 K Hawkins (n 9), 244-245. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., 302-303. 
79 OFT Decision No. CA98/8/2003 Agreements between Hasbro UK Ltd, Argos Ltd and Littlewoods Ltd 
fixing the price of Hasbro toys and games, 21 November 2003. 
80 OFT Decision No. CA98/6/2003 Price-fixing of Replica Football Kit, 1 August 2003. 
81 Decision of the Director General of Fair Trading No. CA98/2/2001 Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd 
and Subsidiaries (NAPP), 30 March 2001. 
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included the construction,82 tobacco,83 and dairy industries.84 In focusing on these 
products and industries, which are more easily recognisable to the general public than 
obscure component parts higher up in the supply chain, the OFT was undoubtedly 
building moral and political consensus for tough sanctions against anti-competitive 
behaviour.85 The selection of these cases would have helped to illustrate the harm that 
can result from anti-competitive behaviour to the OFT’s key constituents, thus justifying 
(and giving legitimacy to) the OFT’s enforcement powers and strategy. This approach 
would have helped to establish normative commitment to the civil prohibitions, and 
would have helped to overcome any legitimacy deficit that existed as a result of applying 
traditional deterrence theory in implementing the civil sanctions. Nonetheless, the OFT’s 
case selection under its civil enforcement programme was also the subject of some 
criticism,86 although the heaviest blow was struck against its case management processes 
and internal quality review.87 The OFT’s case selection record and prioritisation strategy 
for its civil enforcement programme had some clear successes that were tempered, 
perhaps overshadowed, by the problems in managing investigations through to outcomes, 
and its poor record on appeal. On the OFT’s record regarding its criminal enforcement 
programme however, the OFT’s exercise of enforcement discretion in case selection was 
just as damning as the overall level of enforcement activity and its devastating 
performance in court.  
The immediate task facing the OFT when selecting the first case to bring under s 
188 EA02 was presumably to identify a case where the evidence was particularly strong, 
the facts were fairly straightforward, and an injury to some defined group of individuals 
could be fairly assumed, even if it need not be proven. This would allow the OFT, as a 
new prosecutor, to build an unambiguous narrative that the conduct was harmful and, 
irrespective of the requirements of the substantive law, morally blameworthy according 
to established norms. By placing the conduct within a known and understood framework 
of values88 it would be regarded as fair, right, proper, and appropriate to judge and jury 
that the defendants were facing a criminal prosecution, with the potential sentence of 
imprisonment.89 Such a prosecution would be perceived as legitimate, and be capable of 
helping to overcome any pre-existing legitimacy deficiencies within the legislative 
                                                 
82 OFT Decision No. CA98/2/2009 Bid rigging in the construction industry in England, 21 September 
2009. 
83 OFT Decision in Case CE/2596/03: Tobacco, 15 April 2010. 
84 OFT Decision No. CA98/3/2011 Dairy retail price initiatives, 26 July 2011. 
85 Kovacic (n 63) 65-66 and Stephan (n 72) 391-392. For a positive view of the OFT’s early civil 
enforcement work under the Competition Act 1998, see A Riley, ‘Outgrowing the European Administrative 
Model? Ten Years of British Anti-Cartel Enforcement’ in BJ Rodger (ed) Ten Years of UK Competition 
Law Reform (DUP 2010).  
86 See discussion in e.g. C Graham, ‘The Reform of UK Competition Policy’ (2012) 8(3) European 
Competition Journal 539, D Ridyard, ‘Another Fine Mess: OFT Proposals Pave the Way to Effects-Based 
Analysis of Competition Law Penalties’ (2013) 34(3) ECLR 128, P Freeman, ‘Competition Policy in the 
UK – Lessons from the Past Decade’ (2011) 10(4) Competition Law Journal 251, 260-261. 
87 See National Audit Office, “The Office of Fair Trading: Enforcing Competition in Markets”, HC 593 
(2005–06), 17 November 2005, and discussion in S Wilks, ‘Institutional Reform and the Enforcement of 
Competition Policy in the UK’ (2011) 7(1) European Competition Journal 1. 
88 Hawkins (n 9), 244-245. 
89 See a general discussion of fairness and legitimacy in this context by Kovacic (n 63) 53-55, particularly 
60. 
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regime. It would have been naïve to form the view that all the OFT needed to do in its 
first prosecution was to satisfy a strict reading of the offence as judges do more than 
oversee advocates seeking to persuade juries, and juries come into the jury box with the 
same views as the general public. The judiciary has various procedural tools that can be 
deployed to derail or weaken a criminal prosecution90 and so early prosecutions needed to 
be clear cut and dealing with unambiguously wrongful conduct, thus implicitly reassuring 
the judiciary that it was fair and just that the individual(s) were facing imprisonment,91 
and that the OFT was a competent prosecutor.92  
As it happens the first s 188 EA02 prosecution was more thrust upon the OFT, 
than selected by it. The case arose out of a bid-rigging and price-fixing cartel in the 
international market for supplying marine hoses. Given that marine hoses are large 
flexible rubber hoses used to transfer oil, and the harm was primarily inflicted upon 
offshore extraction and transportation companies, far up in the supply chain, this case 
would never be one to galvanise public support for criminalisation. Indeed, the esoteric 
nature of the product created a barrier in itself in prosecuting the case before a jury, and 
the prosecutor would have had a difficult task in building sympathy for the victims of this 
cartel so that imprisoning the cartelists appeared a fair, right, proper, and appropriate 
outcome. However, the circumstances of the case made it unnecessary to win over a jury 
as the three defendants agreed to plead guilty following their arrest in the United States 
and subsequent plea agreements with the US Department of Justice. The terms of the plea 
agreements for Peter Whittle, David Brammar, and Bryan Allison were remarkable, and 
entailed them agreeing to minimum jail terms in the United States, but they would return 
to the UK in order to plead guilty to the cartel offence under s 188 EA02, and serve their 
sentences in the UK.93 If the sentences handed down by the UK courts equalled or 
exceeded the terms of the US plea agreements then the US prison sentences would 
essentially be discharged. Crucially, as part of the plea agreements the defendants agreed 
not to seek shorter periods of imprisonment from the UK courts than agreed as part of the 
plea agreement, and if shorter sentences were imposed by the UK courts, the defendants 
agreed to return to the United States for further sentencing94 (and would be liable to 
extradition proceedings if they refused to voluntarily return).  
                                                 
90 See Kovacic (n 63) 53. For a discussion of judicial reluctance to make use of incarceration in cartel cases 
see Harding, Beaton-Wells, & Edwards (n 60). 
91 See Hawkins (n 9), 303, Calvani and Calvani (n 25) 137-140, DD Sokol, ‘Cartels, Corporate 
Compliance, and What Practitioners Really Think About Enforcement’ (2012) 78 Antitrust Law Journal 
201, 237, DM Low and CW Halliday, ‘Redesigning a Criminal Cartel Regime: The Canadian Conversion’ 
in C Beaton-Wells & A Ezrachi (eds), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory 
Movement (Hart Publishing 2011), 103, and P Massey and JD Cooke, ‘Competition Offences in Ireland: 
The Regime and its Results’ in C Beaton-Wells & A Ezrachi (eds), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies 
of an International Regulatory Movement (Hart Publishing 2011), 121. 
92 For a discussion of the impact of court doubts about the capability of the US FTC in the 1970s and 1980s 
see WE Kovacic, ‘The Modern Evolution of US Competition Policy Norms’ (2003-2004) 71 Antitrust Law 
Journal 377, 397-399, 413. 
93 See plea agreements entered into in U.S. v. Peter Whittle (Criminal No. H-07-487-03, U.S. v. David 
Brammar (Criminal No. H-07-487-02), and U.S. v. Bryan Allison (Criminal No. H-07-487-01), 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/allison.htm> accessed 18 November 2016.  
94 See plea agreements entered into in U.S. v. Peter Whittle (Criminal No. H-07-487-03, U.S. v. David 
Brammar (Criminal No. H-07-487-02), and U.S. v. Bryan Allison (Criminal No. H-07-487-01) at 
paragraphs 16-17 of those agreements, <http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/allison.htm> accessed 18 
November 2016. 
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On the one hand, through this case, the OFT was able to ‘jump-start’ its criminal 
enforcement programme,95 and the United States benefitted from offenders serving jail 
time abroad as well as attaining the soft-power benefit of purportedly strengthening a 
fellow criminal antitrust regime. On the other hand, this precedent-setting case would not 
assist with earning legitimacy for the cartel offence before juries, and the predetermined, 
packaged nature of the prison sentences always risked undermining efforts to build 
support of the judiciary for the offence. It was therefore far from the ideal case with 
which to establish greater normative commitment to the law. Yet the OFT had little other 
option than to go along, particularly as political pressure would have been building to 
make use of the criminal enforcement powers that it gained over 4 years previously,96 and 
the defendants’ counsel were pushing the plea agreements to ensure their clients served 
jail time in the UK, closer to home.97  
Given the lack of societal support for criminalisation in the UK, and that the 
House of Lords had previously ruled that cartel conduct was not criminal before the 
Enterprise Act 2002 entered into force,98 it came as a shock to the defendants, and likely 
a pleasant surprise to the OFT, that the Crown Court judge imposed longer sentences 
upon the defendants than they had agreed to under the terms of the US plea agreement.99 
Judge Rivlin also imposed director disqualification orders (DO) on all three defendants, 
although on the basis of s 2 CDDA86 allowing for the imposition of a DO following 
conviction of an indictable offence, and not on the basis of s 9A CDDA86 allowing 
competition disqualification orders to be imposed. The longer jail sentences did not stand 
however, as the English Court of Appeal reduced the terms of imprisonment down to the 
terms that the defendants agreed to in the US plea agreements.100 It is the ruling of the 
Court of Appeal that has led at least one commentator to describe it as a ‘pyrrhic victory’ 
for the OFT.101 In rendering the Court’s judgment Hallett LJ took several opportunities to 
highlight the judges’ discomfort that the defendants were not seeking to reduce their 
sentences to below the terms of their US plea agreements, so as to avoid having to return 
to the US upon their UK release.102  
With the convictions the OFT was provided with its first success under s 188 
EA02, yet it was no closer to providing much needed legitimacy to the offence, not least 
because Hallett LJ stated that ‘we have our doubts as to the propriety of a US prosecutor 
                                                 
95 Calvani and Calvani (n 25) 139-140. 
96 Indeed Beaton-Wells argues that the OFT was overly risk averse and waited too long for the ‘right’ case, 
which perhaps resulted in its predicament in Marine Hoses, see C Beaton-Wells, ‘Cartel Criminalisation 
and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission: Opportunities and Challenges’ in C Beaton-
Wells & Ariel Ezrachi (eds), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory 
Movement (Hart Publishing 2011), 194. 
97 For an excellent insight into the cartel operations as well as the circumstances of the US arrest and plea 
agreement negotiations see An Interview of Bryan Allison by M O’Kane, ‘Does prison work for cartelists? 
– The view from behind bars’ (2011) 56(2) Antitrust Bulletin 483. 
98 Norris v. U.S. [2008] 1 AC 920, also see discussion in P Whelan, ‘Resisting the Long Arm of Criminal 
Antitrust Laws: Norris v The United States’ (2009) 72(2) MLR 272. 
99 Judgment of HHJ Geofrey Rivlin QC in R. v. Whittle, Allison, & Brammar, unreported, Southwark 
Crown Court, 11 June 2008. 
100 R. v. Whittle, Allison & Brammar [2008] EWCA Crim.2560, 14 November 2008 
101 J Joshua (n 68) 138-139. 
102 See R. v. Whittle, Allison & Brammar [2008] EWCA Crim.2560, 14 November 2008 at [27] – [32]. 
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seeking to inhibit the way in which counsel represent their clients in a UK court’.103 
Given the judicial doubts it seems unlikely that the sentences handed down could be 
clearly regarded as fair, right, proper, and appropriate from a UK perspective, and thus 
the outcome of the first cartel offence prosecution has glaring legitimacy issues. On the 
face of it the convictions in Marine Hoses appeared to boost the OFT’s objective of 
preventing cartels by indicating a rise in the probability of sanction, and so boosting 
overall deterrence. On deeper analysis however, the circumstances of the case most likely 
diminished the perception of the cartel offence and the OFT as capable of exercising 
prosecutorial enforcement discretion in fair and appropriate manner in the eyes of key 
constituents, i.e. the judiciary, legal and business communities, and the wider public.104 
As discussed above, a diminishing perception of fairness and neutrality can undermine 
legitimacy and voluntary compliance with the law.105 This is especially true as a 
perceived increase in deterrence cannot overcome a lack of normative commitment to the 
law, and the law itself already had legitimacy issues arising from the original legislative 
framing. 
While Marine Hoses was somewhat foisted on the OFT, the decision to select an 
alleged two firm cartel, involving the price-fixing of air passenger fuel surcharges 
between British Airways (BA) and Virgin Atlantic Airways (VAA), as the test case for 
the first contested prosecution was within its own control.106 On the face of it, a case 
involving well known firms and rivals colluding to fix the charges imposed on air 
passengers has the potential to resonate with the general public, and thus the pool of 
potential jurors. Jurors would likely understand and relate to the facts of a case involving 
the setting of fuel surcharges, and even if the formulas for the setting of prices quickly 
become complicated, they may well know someone who paid such a charge while 
booking a transatlantic flight, enabling a sense of the impact of any collusion in the real 
world. In short, the case appeared to be able to be categorised as involving obviously 
wrongful conduct that was easily framed within established moral norms, such that 
exercising discretion to prosecute would be perceived as fair, right, proper, and 
appropriate. Yet the suitability of the case as the OFT’s first contested prosecution begins 
and ends with the proximity of the conduct to the ordinary consumer and average person 
                                                 
103 R. v. Whittle, Allison & Brammar [2008] EWCA Crim.2560, 14 November 2008 at [28]. As a more 
general matter, UK courts’ resistance to plea bargaining is well known and should come as no surprise, see 
e.g. discussion in M Furse, The Criminal Law of Competition in the UK and in the US: Failure and Success 
(Edward Elgar 2012), 152, and press reporting such as J Croft and M Peel, ‘Judge condemns BAE plea 
deal’ Financial Times, 21 December 2010, and C Binham and E Hammond, ‘Judge calls for more funding 
for SFO’ Financial Times, 24 May 2012. It may be that the introduction of deferred prosecution agreements 
(DPAs) into UK law, as a result of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 Schedule 17, will bring about a more 
general shift in the attitude of the courts in this area, although it is perhaps unlikely that any shift would 
alter the view taken of a US prosecutor seeking to constrain the options open to a UK court. 
104 For a discussion of the sense of fairness of the US plea agreement system see M O’Kane (n 97). 
105 See above notes 37-39, and accompanying text. 
106 Although this is not to dismiss the likely presence of pressure upon the OFT to reach a decision in the 
case, and separately to increase the use of its criminal enforcement powers. The pace of international 
developments in parallel cartel investigations also likely added pressure on the OFT officials to decide 
whether to bring a prosecution in the UK or not, see e.g. the plea agreement entered into by British Airways 
with the US Department of Justice under which BA agreed to pay a $300 million criminal fine for its role 
in fixing the price of passenger and cargo flights, 1 August 2007,  
<http://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/2007/224928.htm> accessed 18 November 2016.  
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on the high street. One foreseeable difficulty with the operation of modern day criminal 
enforcement programmes is the tension between competition authority leniency 
programmes and criminal prosecutions.107 Under the terms of leniency programmes in 
most developed competition law jurisdictions, the first firm to approach the authorities 
with information relating to a cartel not already under investigation will receive full 
immunity from civil sanctions, and its employees will receive immunity from 
prosecution.108 The lure of immunity is designed to destabilise cartels and create a race to 
confess amongst cartelists,109 and the conventional wisdom is that these programmes are 
overwhelmingly successful.110 The tension arises in the criminal law sphere where the 
principle of equal treatment applies and criminal co-conspirators would generally not be 
expected to receive vastly differing treatment,111 especially in jurisdictions where the 
prosecutor must aim to be an unbiased pursuer of justice.112 Yet in a multi-party cartel 
two equally culpable cartelists may be subjected to extremely different treatment, with 
one firm and its employees receiving full immunity, and the other potentially receiving 
multi-million dollar fines, and key individuals being imprisoned for up to 10 years (to use 
the US as an example). The US antitrust criminal enforcement programme has thrived in 
spite of this tension with leniency, yet this may be due to a number of factors peculiar (so 
far at least) to the US antitrust regime and its enforcement experience, and not easily or 
quickly replicated elsewhere. The implications of the relationship between 
criminalisation and leniency are still to be fully understood,113 but the existence of plea 
bargaining in the US,114 coupled with an established enforcement record, built on astute 
and prudent case selection,115 are certainly factors in the cohabiting relationship in US 
antitrust. Notwithstanding the tolerated cohabitation between criminal sanctions and 
leniency in the US, there are several reasons to expect that the inherent tension between 
                                                 
107 Indeed to some extent there is also a tension between leniency programmes and civil antitrust 
enforcement given that leniency results in disparate treatment before the law, one commentator describes 
the existence of leniency programmes as prioritizing efficiency objectives over moral condemnation, see 
Furse (n 103) 46. 
108 For a good comparative discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the EU and US antitrust leniency 
programmes see N Zingales, ‘European and American Leniency Programmes: Two Models Towards 
Convergence?’ (2008) 5(1) Competition Law Review 5. 
109 CR Leslie, ‘Trust, Distrust and Antitrust’ (2004) 82(3) Texas Law Review 515. 
110 See e.g. MA Utton, Cartels and Economic Collusion: The Persistence of Corporate Conspiracies 
(Edward Elgar 2011), particularly Chapter 7, and JS Sandhu, ‘The European Commission’s leniency 
policy: a success?’ (2007) 28(3) ECLR 148, although see notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
111 The difficulty in combining immunity with a criminal enforcement programme is particularly acute in 
jurisdictions adhering to the principle of mandatory prosecution, on this point and that of the principle of 
equal treatment see P Whelan, The Criminalization of European Cartel Enforcement: Theoretical, Legal, 
and Practical Challenges (OUP 2014), 240-241. 
112 See e.g. the principles that must be followed by the Crown Prosecutors in England and Wales, such that 
their decisions must be unbiased and objective, detailed at <https://www.cps.gov.uk/about/principles.html> 
accessed 18 November 2016. This approach is in contrast to the heralding of high conviction rates and 
sentences in jurisdictions where prosecutors are elected officials, or political appointees.  
113 See Harding, Beaton-Wells, & Edwards (n 60), 234. 
114 For a useful discussion of the value of plea bargaining in the US as compared with other jurisdictions 
see OECD Competition Committee, ‘Plea Bargaining/Settlement of Cartel Cases’ (DAF/COMP(2007)38, 
22 January 2008), available at: <https://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/40080239.pdf> accessed 18 
November 2016.   
115 See discussion in P Whelan (n 111), 271 – 272.  
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the two will exacerbate the legitimacy problems in trying to establish the criminal cartel 
offence in the UK, not least as a result of the UK’s case selection history.116  
The tension between leniency and criminal enforcement arose in R. v. Burns and 
others (British Airways)117 as VAA sought immunity under the terms of the UK leniency 
programme in March 2006, which prompted the OFT to instigate twin track civil and 
criminal investigations involving separate case teams.118 The OFT’s handling of the 
criminal investigation following VAA’s immunity application exposed many procedural 
failings on its part.119 The failings ranged from the OFT’s approach to securing 
admissions of guilt from VAA managers,120 its failure to undertake detailed analysis of 
how passenger fuel surcharges and flight fees are actually fixed, and particularly its 
overreliance on VAA’s solicitors to provide it with relevant evidence.121 Hodges notes 
the importance of actual and perceived fairness, and transparency, in enforcement 
procedure to secure legitimacy,122 yet it is clear that the potential perception of bias 
towards VAA with each of these procedural failings creates significant legitimacy 
problems. The final issue led to a significant failure to disclose evidence pre-trial, such 
that 70,000 emails previously thought to be lost were recovered mid-trial, some of which 
would have had an ‘appreciable impact’ on the evidence to be presented.123 The breach of 
the OFT’s statutory duty to disclose the emails, combined with its failure to undertake the 
pricing analysis resulted in the trial collapsing three weeks into a trial that was expected 
to last six months. These failings, and the high profile collapse of the trial, was predicted 
to ‘seriously undermine the credibility of the UK’s criminal offence’.124 A key reason for 
the debilitating effect on the criminal cartel offence was that in addition to undermining 
confidence in the OFT to bring prosecutions, it also very publicly diminished the 
perceived likelihood of sanction under s 188 EA02, thereby reducing the deterrent value 
of the offence, which was its raison d’être.  
                                                 
116 For a wider discussion of the relationship and tensions inherent between criminalization and leniency 
see Harding, Beaton-Wells, & Edwards (n 60). 
117 The tensions in the case, which were expertly handled by the trial judge, are discussed in detail in N 
Purnell, C Bellamy, N Kar, D Piccinin, and P Sahathevan, ‘Criminal Cartel Enforcement – More 
Turbulence Ahead? The Implications of the BA/Virgin Case’ (2010) 9(3) Competition Law Journal 313. 
118 OFT Decision No. CA98/01/2012 Airline passenger fuel surcharges for long-haul flights, 19 April 2012, 
paragraphs 22 – 26.  
119 The OFT itself acknowledged several mistakes in the handling of the case in a subsequent internal 
Board review, see OFT, Project Condor Board Review (December 2010), < https://assets.digital.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/media/556876fce5274a1895000008/Project_Condor_Board_Review.pdf> accessed 18 
November 2016. 
120 Although this proved to be less of an issue in light of the ruling of the Court of Appeal in R. v. George 
[2010] EWCA Crim 1148, discussed in text below. 
121 See ‘OFT under fire over whistleblowers after BA price-fixing trial fails’ The Guardian, 11 May 2010. 
The accusation was also made by Ben Emmerson QC that the OFT ‘delegated disclosure’ to VAA’s 
solicitors and that it had been ‘guilty of incompetence on a monumental scale’, as reported in ‘OFT under 
fire over whistleblowers after BA price-fixing trial fails’ The Guardian, 11 May 2010. 
122 C Hodges (n 11), 27. 
123 As reported in ‘Collapsed BA price-fixing trial places OFT and Virgin in the dock’ The Telegraph, 11 
May 2010. 
124 See Stephan (n 72) 392. 
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In addition to the OFT’s analytical failings, selecting the British Airways case for 
the first contested prosecution in the first place was a devastating failure in judgment.125 
It is hard to envisage how the OFT could earn legitimacy through demonstrating fair, 
right, proper, and appropriate exercise of enforcement discretion in a case involving a 
two firm cartel, when one firm’s employees are immunized and the other’s employees are 
subjected to the full force of the criminal law.126 Prosecutions in cases where some firms 
and/or their employees have been granted leniency or immunity may well be legitimate. 
Yet it is difficult to avoid a perception of enforcement bias in a two-party cartel where 
one party has immunity, and where the prosecution seeks legitimacy by implicitly 
framing the conduct within a set of moral norms. The OFT’s policy of targeting high 
impact cases127 backfired spectacularly.128 It appears clear that the OFT became overly 
concerned, perhaps blinded, with demonstrating the severity of sanction to achieve 
general deterrence, and lost sight of the need to ensure the fairness, and appropriateness 
of the sanctions sought in each and every case.129 In its instrumental approach to both the 
criminal law and leniency in this case, the OFT served to further erode the more 
important task of establishing normative commitment to the law, particularly given its 
pre-existing legitimacy defects. Indeed a similar criticism has been made by the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal in relation to the OFT’s civil enforcement programme.130 It 
is the link between the infringement and sanction that secures the procedural fairness of 
the sanction and helps retain normative commitment and overall legitimacy. The failed 
prosecution in British Airways prompted a thorough internal Board review by the OFT, 
which recommended several structural, procedural, and human resource reforms,131 yet 
                                                 
125 The OFT subsequently acknowledged, with some understatement, that ‘it was not ideal as the OFT’s 
first contested criminal case’, OFT, Project Condor Board Review (n 119), 2. 
126 See discussion in P Whelan, ‘Protecting Human Rights in the Context of European Antitrust 
Criminalization’ in I Lianos and I Kokkoris (eds), The Reform of EC Competition Law: New Challenges 
(Kluwer 2010), 173 – 175, Furse (n 103) 157 – 159, and P Crowther, ‘Opinion: Reform of cartel legislation 
lacks specificity’ The Lawyer, 11 April 2011. For an excellent account of the conflicts and practical 
difficulties associated with prosecutorial dependence upon one firm’s employees as ‘immunised witnesses’ 
in prosecutions against their co-cartelists, see A MacCulloch and B Wardhaugh, ‘The Baby and the 
Bathwater: The Relationship in Competition Law between Private Enforcement, Criminal Penalties, and 
Leniency Policy, A paper prepared for the Centre for Competition Policy Conference, UEA, 14 June 2012, 
available on SSRN at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2089369> accessed 18 
November 2016. 
127 See e.g. discussion regarding the OFT’s prioritisation around impact and outcome, in a speech by J 
Fingleton, former Chief Executive of the OFT, ‘UK Competition Policy: the first decade’ at the 40th 
Anniversary of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, London, 
<http://www.fingletonassociates.com/speeches/uk-competition-policy-first-decade/> accessed 18 
November 2016. Also see M Bloom, ‘The Competition Act at 10 years old: enforcement by the OFT and 
the sectoral regulators’ (2010) 9(2) Competition Law Journal 141, 141 – 142. 
128 See reporting by C Binham, ‘Cloud hangs over crime agencies as chiefs step down’ Financial Times, 23 
February 2012. 
129 See notes 26-39 above and accompanying text. 
130 Eden Brown Limited v. OFT [2011] CAT 8, Final Judgment of 1 April 2011 at paragraph 99 where the 
CAT stated: ‘in having regard to the need for deterrence, it is important not to lose sight of the need for the 
penalty properly to reflect also the culpability of the undertaking in terms of the seriousness, and hence the 
scale and effect of the infringement’. 
131 OFT, Project Condor Board Review (n 119). See press reporting by A Osborne, ‘Flight of the OFT’s 
Condor was doomed to crash on the BA runway’, The Telegraph, 17 December 2010. 
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the wider legacy is probably its contribution to the debate as to whether the criminal 
cartel offence was fit for purpose.  
The OFT’s criminal enforcement record under s 188 EA02 neither begins nor 
ends with British Airways and so it is useful to consider the record in full. In the 11 years 
of the OFT’s criminal cartel powers it has secured one uncontested prosecution, suffered 
a humiliating collapse at trial, opened and closed three investigations,132 and transferred 
two across to the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) on 31 March 2014.133 This 
thin record undoubtedly created a very low perception of the likelihood of sanctions, and 
it sits in stark contrast to the pre-EA02 prediction that introducing a criminal cartel 
offence would lead to six to ten prosecutions a year.134 Even if that estimate was always 
going to be wildly optimistic, the enforcement record under s 188 EA02 would likely be 
of the kind Baker had in mind when commenting that: ‘having a criminal law against a 
profitable activity is unlikely to be effective as a deterrent if the normal prosecutions are 
so infrequent as to appear more like random lightning strikes or prosecutorial 
vendettas’.135 Empirical studies support this by pointing to the greater importance of the 
perception of likelihood of sanction, over the severity of sanction, in motivating 
compliance.136 The legitimacy concerns that always surrounded s 188 EA02 were only 
heightened in light of the manner in which the OFT exercised its enforcement discretion, 
particularly in relation to its judgment when selecting cases to prosecute. Yet it was not 
quite the fatal blow for the offence as the UK Government decided to try to legislate to 
improve the effectiveness of s 188 EA02.137 
                                                 
132 The investigations concerned suspected cartel activity in the supply of agricultural products (from April 
2010 – August 2011), between suppliers in the automotive industry (from February 2010 – October 2011), 
and between commercial vehicle manufacturers (from September 2010 – December 2011). 
133 These investigations involved suspected criminal cartel conduct in the construction industry, and 
suspected criminal cartel conduct in relation to the supply of galvanized steel tanks for water storage. The 
former case has resulted in a guilty plea from one defendant and proceedings are ongoing by the CMA 
(<https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/criminal-investigation-into-the-supply-of-products-to-the-construction-
industry> accessed 18 November 2016), and the latter case resulted in a guilty plea from one defendant 
before trial, and in the finding of two other defendants as not guilty at trial in June 2015, see further 
discussion below (see ‘CMA statement following completion of criminal cartel prosecution’ CMA Press 
Release, 24 June 2015, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-statement-following-completion-of-
criminal-cartel-prosecution> accessed 18 November 2016).   
134 Office of Fair Trading, The proposed criminalisation of cartels in the UK – A report prepared for the 
Office of Fair Trading by Sir Anthony Hammond KCB QC and Roy Penrose OBE QPM, (OFT 365, 
November 2001) at 3.6. Although note that some may not regard the thin record as having a particular 
impact on firms’ risk assessments given the continuing existence of the cartel offence and at least one 
prosecution, see B Rusch, ‘Risk Modelling and Antitrust Risk Assessment in Light of UK Cartel 
Enforcement Policy’ (2014) 13(1) Competition Law Journal 107. 
135 Baker (n 28) 35. 
136 See above at notes 26-28 and accompanying text. Also see PH Robinson and JM Darley, ‘Does Criminal 
Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation (2004) 24(2) OJLS 173, 205, and M Levi, ‘Hitting the 
suite spot: sentencing frauds’ (2010) Journal of Financial Crime 116, 125 – 126.  
137 The UK Government set out its reform proposals in Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills, A 
Competition Regime for Growth: A Consultation on Options for Reform (BIS/11/657) (March 2011), < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/a-competition-regime-for-growth-a-consultation-on-options-
for-reform> accessed 18 November 2016. The Government response to the consultation was outlined in 
Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills, Growth, Competition and the Competition Regime, 
Government Response to Consultation (BIS/12/512) (March 2012), < 
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4. The Nightmare Reform of the Cartel Offence 
In assessing the deterrent value and legitimacy of the UK competition authorities’ 
criminal enforcement programme, as well as the impact of the changes brought about by 
the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA13), it is unnecessary to consider 
the alternative reform proposals for s 188EA02 put forward before the Act was passed, 
which already has a considerable literature base.138 Instead it is important to focus on the 
reforms that have been implemented, and assess whether these reforms will facilitate a 
much-needed improvement in the effectiveness and legitimacy of the criminal cartel 
offence under s 188 EA02. It is the argument of this article that the reforms will not 
improve the effectiveness or legitimacy of the cartel offence, and in fact they have 
already created significant uncertainty in the law as a result of a bizarre new statutory 
defence, such as to further undermine and fail to secure the legitimacy of the criminal 
cartel offence. 
The ERRA13 brought about several significant reforms to the UK competition 
law regime of relevance here, including the merger of the OFT and Competition 
Commission (CC) into the new CMA139 and of course the amendments to the operation 
of the cartel offence. The Government’s reforms removed the dishonesty standard and 
crafted the revised cartel offence so that it does not include cartel arrangements made 
openly, which is to say arrangements that have been published before being implemented. 
The primary motivation here was to remove dishonesty because of the perception that it 
was making the offence harder to prosecute,140 setting aside that criminal offences should 
be hard to prosecute,141 in the belief that this would thereby facilitate an increase in the 
number of prosecutions and in the perception of likelihood of sanction. As with the 
introduction of individual sanctions under the EA02, the ERRA13 reforms were clearly 
motivated by an instrumental motivation to increase the deterrent effect of sanctions in 
UK competition law, without much thought as to whether it would help engender 
community confidence in the offence. In order to remove dishonesty without leaving an 
                                                                                                                                                 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/growth-competition-and-the-competition-regime-
government-response-to-consultation> accessed 18 November 2016.  
138 For a gateway into the reform debate before the passing of the ERRA13 see Wardhaugh (n 53), A 
Bailin, ‘Doing Away with Dishonesty’ (2011) 10(3) Competition Law Journal 169, J Joshua, ‘Shooting the 
Messenger: Does the UK Criminal Cartel Offense Have a Future?’ (2010) theantitrustsource, August, P 
Whelan, ‘Cartel Criminalization and the Challenge of “Moral Wrongfulness”’ (2013) 33(3) OJLS 535, and 
R Patel, ‘The Removal of Dishonesty from the Cartel Offense and the Publication Defense: A Panacea?’ 
(2012) May CPI Antitrust Chronicle 1. 
139 Although note that the Competition Commission had no role in relation to the criminal cartel offence, or 
the civil prohibition against anti-competitive agreements under s 2 CA98, prior to the ERRA13, and so the 
merger of itself had no direct impact on the criminal enforcement programme. 
140 Government Response to Consultation (BIS/12/512) (n 137), paragraph 7.2. The Government was also 
supported by the OFT in deciding to remove dishonesty, see Chapter 5 of ‘The OFT’s response to the 
Government’s consultation’, June 2011 (OFT1335),  < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/312068/L-O-competition-
regime-for-growth.pdf> accessed 18 November 2016.  
141 See Bailin (n 138) 173. 
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overly broad, almost strict liability criminal offence,142 additional safeguards were 
necessary. The ERRA13 inserted statutory exclusions under s 188A, which apply where 
customers are notified of the potentially criminal arrangement in advance of entering into 
agreements with the parties to the cartel,143 as well as where sufficient information 
relating to the arrangement is published before implementation.144 The latter publication 
exclusion is somewhat anachronistic as it is satisfied only where the information is 
published via an advertisement in any of the London Gazette, the Edinburgh Gazette, or 
the Belfast Gazette.145 It is useful to remember that any cartel arrangements that are either 
notified to customers, or published in the UK official public record, are not excluded 
from civil liability under s 2 CA98 (or from exposure to actions for damages for that 
matter), although engaging in an openly anti-competitive arrangement is deemed of less 
seriousness than covert conduct such that the criminal law is not utilized. One can briefly 
ponder whether the general public would consider it fair, right, proper, and appropriate to 
use publication of a notice of a cartel arrangement in the London Gazette, as the litmus 
test for criminality. Nonetheless, further safeguards against an overly broad criminal 
offence are also inserted into s 188B EA02, which provides for three new defences to the 
offence. The first two defences are a natural extension of s 188A EA02, and provide a 
defence to the conduct where the individual lacks intent at the time of making the 
agreement to conceal the nature of the arrangements from customers146 on the one hand, 
or the CMA147 on the other. Yet it is the third defence that surprised observers and has 
given rise to concern and debate.148 
In a spectacular display of self-defeating legislative drafting s 188B(3) EA02 
provides a defence to the cartel offence where an individual can show that ‘before the 
making of the agreement, he or she took reasonable steps to ensure that the nature of the 
arrangements would be disclosed to professional legal advisers for the purposes of 
obtaining advice about them before their making or (as the case may be) their 
implementation.’ The CMA has stated that it regards ‘professional legal advisers’ as 
applying to external and in-house legal advisers whether qualified in the UK or a foreign 
jurisdiction.149The breadth of this defence to an offence that carries a 5 year term of 
imprisonment is astounding, particularly as read literally it does not require the individual 
to even make a good faith attempt to follow any legal advice provided. The lack of 
Parliamentary debate on the defences, although they were clearly introduced with a 
                                                 
142 bearing in mind that s 188 EA02 is already an inchoate offence where an agreement to implement a 
cartel is as much of an offence as implementation of one, see P Gilbert, ‘Changes to the UK Cartel Offence 
– Be Careful What You Wish For’ (2015) 6(3) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 192. 
143 S 188A(1)(a) EA02, and also see CMA Cartel Offence, Prosecution Guidance (CMA9), 4.13.  
144 s 188A(1)(c) EA02, and also see CMA Cartel Offence, Prosecution Guidance (CMA9), 4.15. 
145 The Enterprise Act 2002 (Publishing of Relevant Information under section 188A) Order 2014, SI 
2014/535. 
146 S 188B(1) EA02. 
147 S 188B(2) EA02, and also see CMA Cartel Offence, Prosecution Guidance (CMA9), 4.23. 
148 See e.g. P Whelan, ‘Does the UK’s New Cartel Offence Contain a Devastating Flaw?’ (21 May 2013) 
post on UEA Competition Policy Blog, <https://competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2013/05/21/does-the-
uks-new-cartel-offence-contain-a-devastating-flaw/> accessed 18 November 2016, A Stephan, ‘Four key 
challenges to the successful criminalization of cartel laws’ (2014) 2(2) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 
333, Corker (n 63) 265, and A Stephan, ‘The UK cartel offence: a purposive interpretation?’ (2014) 12 
Criminal Law Review 879. 
149 CMA Cartel Offence, Prosecution Guidance (CMA9) at 4.24. 
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concern to avoid an overly broad criminal offence,150 displays a level of rigour of review 
on a par with the OFT’s analysis in British Airways. While there is a strong argument for 
the judiciary to adopt a bold purposive interpretation to avoid the ‘manifest absurdity’ of 
merely seeking legal advice acting as a complete defence,151 the interests of legal 
certainty would be best safeguarded by again seeking legislative reform, ideally to 
remove s 188B(3) entirely. The insertion of s 188B(3) EA03 has clearly created 
significant uncertainty as to how effectively the cartel offence can be enforced in the 
future and by introducing a broad new defence, it also operates to further lower the 
perceived likelihood of sanction under s 188 EA02. This is a perverse outcome when the 
reforms were designed to increase the deterrent effect by removing dishonesty to make it 
easier to prosecute individuals under s 188 EA02. 
Removing dishonesty while inserting the obtaining of legal advice as a defence is 
a flawed reform that, surprisingly, could even be argued to be premature. While the 
dishonesty standard undoubtedly posed significant challenges for prosecutors, and 
conceptually it was not a good fit given the lack of public support for imprisoning 
cartelists,152 it provided the OFT with the potential to earn legitimacy through astute 
exercise of enforcement discretion. Interestingly, UK public opinion towards price fixing 
appears to have hardened considerably between 2007 and 2014 alone. In 2007 just 11% 
believed that imprisonment was an appropriate punishment for individuals involved in 
the decision to fix prices, whereas this rose to 27% by 2014.153 In addition, the 63% who 
agreed that price fixing was dishonest in 2007 (and 25% held the view strongly), had rose 
to 91% in 2014 (with 51% holding the view strongly).154 While the vast majority of 
public opinion believes price fixing to be dishonest, there is not yet a majority in support 
of individuals being imprisoned as a result of engaging in that conduct. It is conceivable 
that what Hawkins describes as ‘selective symbolic action’,155 i.e. exercise of 
enforcement discretion by the CMA, most likely though a policy and sanction mix of 
further advocacy efforts, and selection of the right test case, could have seen the first 
successful contested prosecution without changing the law. It is somewhat ironic 
therefore156 that after the passing of the ERRA13 there have been two distinct 
prosecutions under the original s 188 EA02, the first originated with the OFT and was 
continued by the CMA, whereas the second was initiated by the CMA (these will be 
referred to as the ‘legacy prosecutions’). In Galvanised Steel Tanks the OFT charged an 
individual, Peter Nigel Snee, under the original s 188 EA02 with making a dishonest 
agreement in the supply of galvanized steel tanks for water storage.157 Mr Snee later 
                                                 
150 See discussion in A Stephan (n 148) 883. 
151 Ibid. 
152 See A Stephan (n 57) 133. 
153 Compare the results reported in A Stephan (n 57) with A Stephan, ‘Survey of Public Attitudes to Price 
Fixing in the UK, Germany, Italy and the USA’, July 2015 CCP Working Paper 15-8, available on SSRN 
at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2642181>  accessed on 18 November 2016. 
154 Ibid. 
155 K Hawkins (n 9), 244. 
156 The late revival of the cartel offence by the OFT was also surprising and contrary to conventional 
wisdom that no further prosecutions would be possible until reforms entered into force, see e.g. A Stephan, 
‘How dishonesty killed the cartel offence’ (2011) Criminal Law Review 446.  
157 OFT press release of 27 January 2014 (Press Release 04/14), 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-
updates/press/2014/04-14> accessed 18 November 2016. 
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entered a guilty plea under s 188 EA02, and received a 6 month suspended jail 
sentence,158 whereas his two alleged co-cartelists were found not guilty by a jury, in what 
was the first time that a jury had considered s 188 EA02.159 As the dishonesty standard 
continues to apply to cartel behaviour agreed or implemented between 20 June 2003 and 
31 March 2014, it remains possible for the CMA to bring other criminal charges under 
the original offence. The CMA has brought a second legacy prosecution case, in which 
Barry Kenneth Cooper has pleaded guilty to a charge of making a dishonest agreement 
concerning the supply of precast concrete drainage products.160 The wisdom of expending 
public resources to bring a second legacy prosecution must surely be in doubt in light of 
Mr Snee’s lenient sentence and the failure to convince a jury that the two co-defendants, 
who pled not guilty in Galvanised Steel Tanks, had acted dishonestly. Notwithstanding 
this legacy of the original cartel offence, the ERRA13 reforms have done little to improve 
(and may have further eroded) the legitimacy of cartel criminalization, or to increase 
normative commitment to the law, and the CMA is now entirely dependent on the 
judiciary to avoid the offence being undermined as a result of s 188B(3) EA02. The 
decreasing likelihood of sanction under s 188 EA02 in the aftermath of British Airways 
prompted Parliament to intervene in order to make it easier to prosecute the offence so as 
to boost deterrence. Yet this legislative manoeuvre may well have further eroded the 
legitimacy of the offence by undermining proportional justice and a sense of what is fair 
and right,161 as well as reducing deterrence due to the inclusion of s 188B(3) EA02. 
Additionally, the not guilty verdicts in Galvanised Steel Tanks, while involving the pre-
ERRA13 offence, mark a failed prosecution for the CMA and likely perpetuate the 
perception of low probability of sanction under s 188 EA02. The overall level of 
deterrence has also likely suffered as Mr Snee was able to avoid serving any time in jail, 
notwithstanding his suspended sentence and the community service. The legitimacy of s 
188 EA02 moving forward may well suffer a fatal blow if a wily cartelist exploits s 
188B(3) EA02 and the courts adopt a literal interpretation.162 The courts have, 
understandably, hardly been convinced by the prosecutorial efforts to date, and most of 
the earlier failures were not attributable to the inclusion of the dishonesty standard.163 
Given that the tension with leniency and the civil enforcement programme remains, the 
stakes are even higher for the CMA when exercising enforcement discretion to select its 
first prosecution under the revised s 188 EA02. The CMA will need time and good 
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judgment164 in order to resuscitate the new cartel offence if Parliament decides against 
revising s 188B(3) EA02. Given this likely period of uncertainty and inaction (aside from 
any further legacy cases), the circumstances are propitious for the CMA to consider other 
options to enhance the legitimacy of the individual sanctions in UK competition law, and 
start to make routine use of its director disqualification powers. 
 
5. The Path to Legitimizing Individual Sanctions – CDOs 
The CMA, like the OFT before it, has the power to apply to the High Court, or the Court 
of Session in Scotland, for a competition disqualification order (CDO) to be imposed 
under s 9A of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA86).165 In 
hearing the application the Court must issue a disqualification order if the individual is a 
director of a company that has breached competition law, and the individual’s conduct as 
a director makes them unfit to be concerned with company management.166 Alternatively 
the CMA also has the power to accept competition undertakings from an individual who 
is a director of a company that has breached competition law, where their conduct makes 
them unfit to be concerned in company management, and they offer to enter into a 
disqualification undertaking.167 CDOs and competition undertakings can both be for a 
term of up to 15 years.168 The CDO regime was introduced at the same time as the 
criminal cartel offence, 169 but in practice they are likely to be mutually exclusive as 
conviction under s 188 EA02, if charged as an indictable offence, would allow the Court 
to immediately issue a disqualification order under s 2 CDDA86, as happened in Marine 
Hoses.170 This may be a factor in explaining the OFT’s original focus on bringing 
prosecutions against directors under the cartel offence, in that it could lead to an almost 
two-for-one sanction when disqualification under s 2 CDDA86 followed conviction 
under s 188 EA02. It is also perhaps fortuitous that the CMA has a standalone CDO 
power as it was originally recommended in order ‘to put the matter beyond doubt’ that a 
disqualification order could be made against individuals convicted of the cartel offence, 
should the courts not interpret s2 CDDA86 to achieve that result.171 It is more likely 
however that the OFT, and now the CMA, have prioritized bringing prosecutions under 
the criminal cartel offence as it carries the potential for more symbolism and to have 
greater impact,172 as well as a greater deterrent value. Indeed empirical research carried 
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out by Deloitte for the OFT, may justify this as criminal penalties are perceived as more 
important than director disqualification in deterring infringements.173 Yet it is also 
noteworthy that those who responded on behalf of companies ranked CDOs as more 
important than adverse publicity and fines, and only just behind criminal penalties, in 
achieving deterrence.174 Given the distinct deterrent value of CDOs,175 the CMA has the 
opportunity to increase the overall effectiveness of individual sanctions in competition 
law by making use of s 9A CDDA86 (for the first time) and sending the message that 
there is a increasing likelihood of individual sanctions being imposed, notwithstanding 
the uncertainty surrounding s 188 EA02. Perhaps more importantly, use of the CDO 
powers would also enable the CMA to seek a greater normative commitment to 
individual sanctions for anti-competitive behaviour. There is strong evidence to suggest 
that CDOs would be more widely supported by the public, thus affording the CMA with 
greater levels of community confidence, and that they would be regarded as a more 
proportionate sanction to cartel conduct than the criminal cartel offence.176 Indeed 
empirical research carried out in 2014 suggests that 75% of the British public believe that 
individuals who decide to fix prices should be banned from holding senior management 
positions, in contrast to only 27% who believe the individuals should face 
imprisonment.177 The low level of public support for imprisonment, 11 years after s 188 
EA02 first entered into force, highlights the ongoing legitimacy problem facing the CMA 
in exercising discretion to use that particular enforcement tool. The CMA has recently 
demonstrated its willingness to make use of its disqualification powers by procuring the 
first ever disqualification undertaking as a result of individual conduct related to a 
competition law infringement, under s 9B CDDA86. Following on from a CMA 
infringement decision against two online retailers for agreeing not to undercut each other 
on Amazon,178 the CMA has recently secured a disqualification undertaking from one of 
the managing directors involved.179 The use of disqualification undertaking powers in this 
case appears entirely appropriate given that it rests upon an infringement stemming from 
a two party cartel (Trod Ltd and GB eye Ltd) where one party (GB eye Ltd) has gained 
full immunity and protection against prosecution for its employees. The analogy that can 
be drawn against the basic scenario in British Airways suggests that the CMA may be 
turning to its director disqualification powers after learning the lessons from past failures, 
                                                 
173 The deterrent effect of competition enforcement by the OFT: A report prepared for the OFT by Deloitte 
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and it is hoped that this case is the first in a step by the CMA towards making routine use 
of its various director disqualification powers. 
This article does not seek to claim that CDOs and disqualification undertakings 
are the perfect enforcement tool, or that the wider director disqualification regime is itself 
without problems.180 Yet making use of a sanction mix and demonstrating flexibility in 
determining the most appropriate enforcement tools in specific cases could well be more 
effective than adopting a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach whenever cartel offence 
prosecutions may technically be pursued.181 Director disqualification orders require 
diligent enforcement and resources for monitoring in order to prevent individuals evading 
DOs, and becoming involved in the running of firms through informal means, such as 
consultancy work,182 or from being compensated by the firm notwithstanding the DO.183 
The UK has responded to these recurring doubts regarding the CDDA86 regime by 
maintaining public registers of disqualified directors,184 and increasing enforcement 
powers, limitation periods within which to bring DO applications, and expanding the 
statutory definitions for unfitness and acting as a shadow director.185 In spite of concerns 
regarding the limitations of director disqualification regimes, the time has come for the 
small but growing number of competition authorities with DO powers to pro-actively 
make use of, and test the utility of this particular enforcement tool.186  
Lord Woolf described the purpose of the CDDA86 as being ‘the protection of the 
public, by means of prohibitory remedial action, by anticipated deterrent effect on further 
misconduct and by encouragement of higher standards of honesty and diligence in 
corporate management, from those who are unfit to be concerned in the management of a 
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company.’187 The director disqualification regime’s concern with good corporate 
management, and obviously not preventing anti-competitive behaviour, creates a blind 
spot for CDOs in that they only apply to directors, not lower-level management and staff, 
who can easily be responsible for a firm’s involvement in a cartel. In a partial attempt to 
counter this limitation, and recognise the responsibility of directors for instigating a 
culture of compliance within the organisation,188 the CDO applies to three categories of 
director conduct. A director can be caught under s 9A CDDA86 if: firstly, their conduct 
contributed to the breach of competition law;189 secondly, if their conduct did not 
contribute to the breach but they had reasonable grounds to suspect a breach and took no 
steps to prevent it;190 and thirdly where they did not know but ought to have known that 
the conduct constituted a breach of competition law.191 The result is that s 9A CDDA86 
could extend to a large number of directors in instances involving a breach of competition 
law. Furthermore, the requisite breach is satisfied where there is an infringement of the 
prohibition against anti-competitive agreements in both UK192 and EU law,193 as well as 
the prohibition against abuse of a dominant position in both UK194 and EU law.195 The 
breadth of the CDO power therefore captures a considerably wider range of conduct than 
the cartel offence, and combined with the period of disqualification of up to 15 years it is 
a significant sanction in its own right. As with s 188 EA02 however, its deterrence value 
is diminished by a very low perceived likelihood of sanction as neither the OFT, nor 
CMA have ever applied to the court for a CDO to be issued, albeit we now have the first 
disqualification undertaking under s 9B CDDA86.  
The failure to apply for any CDOs in 13 years is baffling, and many believed that 
a change was underway in 2010.196 Following the Deloitte research197 the OFT undertook 
a review of its approach to enforcing its CDO powers, and sought to revise its guidance 
in order to signal that it was willing to seek a CDO if any of the three categories of 
director conduct, outlined above, were satisfied.198 Originally, the OFT had differentiated 
between the different categories of director conduct such that it had stated that it was 
‘likely to apply for CDO’ where the director’s conduct contributed to the breach, i.e. 
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where the director was directly involved in the conduct.199 Secondly, the OFT stated that 
it was ‘quite likely to apply for CDO’ where the director’s conduct did not contribute to 
the breach but he or she had reasonable grounds to suspect a breach and took no steps to 
prevent it, i.e. where there was a failure to take corrective action.200 Finally, the OFT 
stated merely that ‘CDO application not ruled out’ where the director did not know but 
ought to have known that a breach had taken place, i.e. where the director failed to keep 
him or herself sufficiently informed.201 The OFT revised its guidance in June 2010 and 
ostensibly stated that it was likely to apply for a CDO where any of the three categories 
existed,202 and regularly indicated to competition practitioners and the general public that 
it would be making ‘greater use’ of its CDO powers.203 The revised OFT guidelines thus 
sought to deter anti-competitive behaviour more effectively by threatening directors with 
disqualification when they were directly as well as indirectly involved in the conduct, and 
indeed also where they did not but ought to have known that the company was involved 
in a breach of competition law.204 Yet, this amounted to the same pattern of trying to 
increase the perceived severity of sanction (by being willing to apply for a CDO in a 
wider range of circumstances), whilst not actually increasing the likelihood of sanction 
given that no CDO applications were made. 
  The 2010 policy changes amounted to a false dawn for the use of the OFT’s CDO 
powers although the first use of disqualification undertaking powers by the CMA is a 
significant advance on previously empty rhetoric. While the CMA’s 2015/16 annual plan 
made no mention of using its CDO powers even when listing its enforcement tools, and it 
continues to highlight the potential to prosecute criminal cartel activity,205 the Online 
Posters case suggests a willingness to make use of disqualification powers not 
demonstrated before. If the CMA is serious about increasing the deterrent value of 
individual sanctions in UK competition law, and doing so in a way that secures the 
legitimacy of serious sanctions attached to anti-competitive conduct, it should start to 
make routine use of its CDO and broader disqualification powers. Indeed the arguments 
in favour of doing so are compelling and numerous.  
A practical reason for the CMA to expend resources on building for a first s 9A 
CDDA86 application, or at least continuing to pursue disqualification undertakings, is the 
uncertainty surrounding s 188 EA02 due to the s 188B(3) EA02 defence, and the time for 
new cases to come on stream since the revised offence took effect on 1 April 2014. The 
not guilty verdicts in the Galvanised Steel Tanks prosecution and the guilty plea in the 
Precast Concrete Drainage Products case also likely brings the legacy cases under the 
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old dishonesty standard to an end, and thus the CMA should make more resources 
available to supporting CDO applications. Regarding resources more generally, criminal 
investigations and prosecutions are known to consume significant resources that can 
divert attention from elsewhere,206 whereas CDO applications would be far less costly in 
organisational terms (as well as far less risky in reputational terms), and thus a more 
efficient enforcement tool. A further practical reason to pursue CDOs and competition 
disqualification undertakings is that both sanctions are part of a wider company director 
disqualification regime that has been established for a considerable period of time. 
Furthermore, the courts are very familiar with the DO regime, and so there is a wealth of 
decisional practice for guidance.207 An extension of this is that the CMA should be able 
to tap into the expertise within the Insolvency Service at the Department of Business, 
Innovation, and Skills. It should be feasible for the CMA to organise secondments, or 
civil service staff exchanges, with the Insolvency Service in order to bring experience and 
expertise in-house in making DO applications. The CMA also has more control over 
disqualification orders granted under s 9A CDDA86 than under s 2 CDDA86, where the 
latter follows on from a s 188 EA02 conviction. In what appears to be a nuanced drafting 
oversight at the time of the EA02, the CMA has standing to appear before the court (and 
raise matters it considers relevant) where an individual disqualified under s 9A applies 
for leave to act as a director under s 17 CDDA86, but the CMA does not have leave to 
appear in s 17 cases involving a disqualification order under s 2 CDDA86, even where 
this has arisen out of a competition law matter.208 In other words, had the three directors 
in Marine Hoses209 sought leave of the court, under s 17 CDDA86, to act as a director 
during the period of their disqualification, the OFT would not have had standing to 
address the court on the matter, and the same continues to apply to the CMA. 
A more fundamental and policy-orientated rationale for the CMA to make use of 
its CDO powers is that establishing a record of CDO applications will increase the 
perceived likelihood of individual sanction, and thus increase the overall deterrent value. 
Given the very high level of public support for director disqualification (in cartel cases at 
least),210 the CMA would enjoy community confidence and will be able to secure the 
legitimacy of individual sanctions by bringing these applications. While CDO 
applications would not need to entirely replace prosecutions of the criminal cartel 
offence, enforcement activity against individuals via CDOs and disqualification 
undertakings demonstrates vigilant enforcement to those holding the CMA accountable 
for providing value for public funding, whilst giving the CMA time to patiently await the 
right case for a criminal prosecution. Some scholars have highlighted the potential for the 
complexities of criminal sanctions as enforcement tools to lead to enforcement inertia,211 
                                                 
206 See discussion in Wilks (n 45) 347-348, 356-357. 
207 See N Kar, R Walker, and G Davis, ‘Competition disqualification orders and the lessons which can be 
learned from the insolvency context’ (2011) 10(4) Competition Law Journal 306. 
208 This oversight and gap in the power of the OFT, now CMA, to supervise the observance of 
disqualification orders arising out of competition law cases, was identified by Mithani and Galloway (n 
169). 
209 R. v. Whittle, Allison, & Brammar, unreported, Southwark Crown Court, 11 June 2008.  
210 See n 176 and accompanying text. 
211 See V Brisimi and M Ioannidou, ‘Criminalising cartels in Greece: A tale of hasty developments and 
shaky grounds’ (2011) 34(1) World Comp 157, 160, and A Jones and R Williams, ‘The UK response to the 
 32 
or poor case selection, yet seeking to develop the CDO powers for a period of time could 
ultimately save the cartel offence by preventing another high profile prosecutorial failure. 
A final argument could be made that as CDOs entail a lesser deprivation of liberty than 
the criminal cartel offence, it ought to be used as the primary individual sanction to 
increase deterrence, and leave s 188 EA02 as a ‘last resort’212 for the most serious cartel 
cases. For all of these reasons this article strongly encourages the CMA to exercise its 
enforcement discretion to maximize the effectiveness, efficiency, and legitimacy of 
individuals sanctions at its disposal, and to make routine use of its CDO powers, building 
upon the shoot of hope in Online Posters.  
 
6. Conclusion 
S 188 EA02 was introduced over 13 years ago in order to prevent cartel behaviour 
through application of deterrence theory and achieve better results than fines targeted at 
firms could achieve alone. The coupling of a maximum punishment of five years 
imprisonment213 and the expectation of between six to ten prosecutions a year fulfilled 
the severity of sanction and probability of sanction formula under traditional deterrence 
theory for altering the cost-benefit analysis seemingly undertaken by would-be-offenders. 
Yet there are two fundamental problems that arise from the application of this formula to 
the cartel offence. Firstly the criticism that severe sanctions under traditional deterrence 
theory can result in perceived disproportionate outcomes thereby weakening their 
legitimacy due to doubts about whether they fair, right, proper, and appropriate, can also 
be levied against the cartel offence. This is especially relevant given the low level of 
public support for sending cartelists to jail in the UK. Secondly (and perhaps most 
obviously) efforts to bring prosecutions under the cartel offence have fallen far below 
initial expectations, and have been compounded by high profile failings in the exercise of 
enforcement discretion, such that both the OFT and CMA have failed to earn legitimacy 
for s 188 EA02, and the perceived probability of sanction is likely now very low.  
These fundamental problems have weakened the deterrent value of the cartel 
offence, and legislative reforms that sought to revive s 188 EA02 have only served to 
further question the legitimacy of the offence and make it more difficult to secure 
normative commitment to the law and voluntary compliance on the part of would-be 
cartelists. Perhaps these problems should not be surprising for an offence that has been 
described as ‘an exercise in gesture politics intended as much to capture headlines as to 
deter wrongdoing.’214 Yet the problems associated with the cartel offence also provide an 
opportunity, and the timing is propitious, to earn legitimacy for individual sanctions in 
competition law by seeking to establish the CDO, and competition undertakings, as a 
likely sanction in response to anti-competitive wrongdoing. Any shift away from an 
established policy approach, such as this article’s suggestion of placing a lower emphasis 
upon seeking criminal prosecutions, is difficult for authorities that can become ‘hard-
wired’ to an approach favoured by political masters, yet it is also clear that tough 
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questions are required in order to try to increase compliance with the law.215 If the CMA 
wants to prevent anti-competitive behaviour through deterring wrongdoing and also 
securing voluntary compliance, it should reassess past approaches and adopt a strategy 
that prioritises earning legitimacy for the individual sanctions. This article argues that 
such a revised strategy should first make use of s 9A CDDA86 powers, and build upon 
Online Poster216s by routinely seeking disqualification undertakings under s 9B 
CDDA86, at least until a perfect test cast for prosecution under s 188 EA02 arises, or 
Parliament corrects its flawed reform in establishing the defence in s 188B(3) EA02. 
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